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Article 6

COMMANDEERING COPYRIGHT
Michael E. Kenneally*
This Article examines the increasingly common phenomenon of copyright commandeering, which is the use of standardizedcontracts and other legal devices to reassign, on a massive scale, the entitlements initially assigned by copyright law. Though
many commentators have discussed examples of this phenomenon, it is more widespread
than existing commentary suggests. Users of copyrighted works as well as copyright
owners have attempted to reassign a wide range of copyright entitlements.
Yet although previous writers have taken too narrow a view of what qualifles as
commandeering, they have simultaneously criticized commandeering with arguments
that are too broad. This Article shows where such criticisms overreach and proposes a
new response to commandeering that focuses on the practical differences between property rights, such as copyright law provides, and contract rights created through private
actions. Courts should refuse to enforce those large-scale copyright entitlement transfers
that operate as alterations of property rights to the detriment of individuals who have
not consented to the change.
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INTRODUCTION

Over the last fifteen years, private parties have sought to reassign
the rights that federal law grants to creators and users of copyrighted
works in novel and ambitious ways.

ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg'

encouraged such ambitions by upholding a standard form software
agreement that prohibited the unauthorized copying of uncopyrightable factual material. Since that decision, creators and users alike
have pursued diverse strategies for reallocating copyright entitlements
to further their own interests. What sets these developments apart
from their predecessors in previous decades is the enormous scale on
which they occur. No longer is the transfer of copyright entitlements
principally the result of individual negotiations or simple litigation.
Copyright entitlements are now routinely transferred in the aggregate. And aggregated across large numbers of creators or users, these
transfers operate like revisions of the copyright laws, provided that
courts enforce them. The extent to which courts should enforce such
transfers, however, is open to debate. On the one hand, they might
serve to channel assets to those parties who value them most. On the
other hand, they might undermine the policies of copyright law or
impose net social costs. Either way, these large-scale transfers dramatically change the way that copyrights operate, and recognizing them
risks allowing private parties to commandeer copyright law for their
own purposes.
The standard form license agreement is a familiar species of
large-scale copyright entitlement transfer. In the digital age, users of
technology agree almost daily to contracts labeled "Terms of Use" or
"End User License Agreement." Intellectual property licenses have
attracted significant academic attention and continue to do so,2 but
with few exceptions the scholarly consensus is that licenses that aug1 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
2 See, e.g., Symposium, IntellectualProperty and ContractLaw for the Information Age:
The Impact of Article 2B of the Uniform Commercial Code on the Future of Information and
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ment intellectual property rights are bad for society.8 Scholars persistently condemn restrictive licenses on grounds of policy and doctrine.
Yet courts have not embraced this scholarship. Recently, for example,
the Ninth Circuit issued two important decisions ratifying right-holders' use of standardized contracts to eliminate privileges assigned by
copyright law to owners of individual copies of copyrighted works. 4
The court could have followed the lead of the district court's thoughtful opinion 5 by distancing itself from precedents that have been criticized for threatening such user privileges as the first sale doctrine. 6
Instead, the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed the significance of those precedents, adopting the now-common approach of ignoring academics'
arguments against restrictive licenses.
A very different massive attempt to rearrange copyright entitlements can be found in the Google Books settlement, which was
rejected by a United States district court last March. 7 Google
attempted to extinguish copyright entitlements held by the authors of
an enormous number of books in an intensely negotiated class action
settlement, but the court held that approving the settlement proposed
by Google would be a misuse of the class action device. 8 The court
worried that an opt-out settlement with as sweeping an effect as the
one Google proposed would yield a result "incongruous with the purpose of the copyright laws" by giving Google permission, going forward, to duplicate copyrighted works without first obtaining
permission from the right-holder.9 As compared to the Ninth Circuit's software licensors, Google was on the other side of the creator/
user divide. Yet Google and those licensors shared the aim of restructuring a significant area of copyright law through private ordering.
Commerce, 87 CALIF. L. REv. 1 (1999); Symposium, The Licensing of IntellectualProperty,
78 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (2011).
3 See infra Part II.
4 See MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Entm't, Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 938-39 (9th Cir.
2010) (adopting essential step defense); Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102,
1103-04 (9th Cir. 2010) (using essential step defense and first sale doctrine). But see
UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Augusto, 628 F.3d 1175, 1180 (9th Cir. 2011) (refusing to
extend Vernor to musical CDs distributed by mail for promotional purposes).
5 Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 555 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1171-74 (W.D. Wash. 2008),
vacated, 621 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2010).
6 See, e.g., Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1110 (acknowledging criticism of MAI Systems
Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993)); Wall Data Inc. v. L.A.
Cnty. Sheriffs Dep't, 447 F.3d 769, 785 n.9 (9th Cir. 2006) (same).
7 Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666, 686 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
8 See id. at 676-77 (characterizing part of the proposed settlement as producing
an "arrangement that exceeds what the Court may permit under Rule 23").
9 Id. at 682.
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As these two dissimilar examples suggest, large-scale copyright
entitlement transfers implicate a variety of policy considerations. This
Article argues for an overarching, normative principle that can provide consistent and sensible answers to the question-which shows no
signs of disappearing-of when courts should enforce such transfers.
This principle derives from the near-truism that copyright's exclusive
rights are designed to function as property rights, albeit property
rights that are limited by certain privileges granted to users of copyrighted works. Although it is a basic premise of copyright law that
creators and users should be able to exchange rights and privileges
through contract, the result of large-scale exchanges can, in the aggregate, go beyond contractual arrangement and generate a new regime
of what are functionally property rights, in place of the property rights
created by copyright law. Because property rights and contract rights
function differently in ways I describe below,' 0 I propose that courts
refuse to enforce massive copyright entitlement transfers that result in
changes to property rights without the consent of the affected parties.
These entitlement transfers-constituting what I call copyright commandeering in the strict sense-form a smaller set than the set of practices that other commentators have condemned, but a larger set than
the set of practices that courts have refused to enforce. By disallowing
copyright commandeering in this strict sense and ensuring that copyright's basic property rights framework remains fixed, courts can combat clear threats to social welfare while also protecting private parties'
settled expectations.
The Article begins in Part I with a tour through the real-world
behavior that exemplifies copyright commandeering. The examples I
discuss do not cover every possible form of commandeering, but they
provide an overview of the variety of private actions that can be analyzed as large-scale transfers of copyright entitlements. Particularly
noteworthy is the fact that users as well as creators orchestrate such
transfers. In Part II, I turn to three lines of argument that have been
advanced by other commentators against forms of commandeering. I
show that each line of argument and its associated doctrinal proposal
are unconvincing because they carry a reasonable concern too far.
Then, in Part III, I present my own case against commandeering,
based on several characteristic features of property rights: they persist
over long stretches of time, are protected by distinctive remedies, and
bind third parties who have had no interaction with the right-holder.
By targeting practices that interfere with these features in the copyright context, my property-based approach is able to account for many
10

See infta Part III.
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of the concerns that have animated other scholars, but avoids the
overreaching that has likely dissuaded courts from policing commandeering more actively. Enforcement of large-scale copyright entitlement transfers can be selective and yet still principled.
I.

MAPPING THE COMMANDEERING LANDSCAPE

At a first cut, copyright commandeering can be divided into offensive and defensive forms. This division is based not on the presence or
absence of aggression, but rather on the position of the party who
engages in the commandeering. Offensive commandeering is done
by those who hold copyrights and attempt to secure greater legal powers over their copyrighted works than they have under copyright law's
initial assignment. Defensive commandeering is done by those who
infringe or are in a position to infringe others' copyrights and wish to
eliminate or take control of the copyright owners' legal powers under
copyright law's initial assignment.
A.

Offensive Copyight Commandeering

1. Restricting Fair Use
The fair use doctrine gives users of copyrighted content a defense
against infringement when their use satisfies a four-factor balancing
test. 1 Successful fair use defenses are most likely when the user is
engaged in criticism, reporting, or educational activities,1 2 or when
the user is transforming the preexisting work to accomplish a new
purpose.' 3 Some scholars have argued that fair use is needed to
11

The four fair use factors are recited in the Copyright Act:
In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a
fair use the factors to be considered shall include(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is
of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.

17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
12 See id. (identifying as examples of fair use "purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research").
13 See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (" [T]he
more transformative the new work, the less will be the significance of other factors,
like commercialism, that may weigh against a finding of fair use."); see also Pierre N.
Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARv. L. Rv. 1105, 1111 (1990) ("If ... the
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ensure that copyright's prohibition of certain expressive acts comports
with the First Amendment.14 Others have argued that fair use corrects for market failure when transaction costs or externalities make
bargaining difficult.15 On anyone's rationale, fair use can be thought
of as securing a right to use expressive material in the face of copyrights that would otherwise forbid it.16

Some copyright owners, however, see some fair use as a threat to
their interests. They thus use contractual mechanisms in an attempt
to limit use of their copyrighted products-even to the point of
prohibiting activities that would be declared fair use under copyright
law. For example, although courts have ruled that certain reverse
engineering is fair use,17 total bans on reverse engineering are now
boilerplate in software licenses.1 8 Some license agreements even tarsecondary use adds value to the original .. . this is the very type of activity that the fair
use doctrine intends to protect for the enrichment of society.").
14 See, e.g., Robert C. Denicola, Copyright and Free Speech: ConstitutionalLimitations
on the Protection of Expression, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 283, 297 (1979) (describing the "capacity of modern fair use doctrine to ease much of the inherent tension between copyright law and the first amendment"); L. Ray Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair
Use, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1, 36 (1987) ("[A] rational fair use doctrine can protect the
rights of free speech.").
15 See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure:A Structural and Economic
Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1600, 1627-35
(1982) (developing an account of fair use on which the trustworthiness of markets is
the principal concern). But cf Robert P. Merges, The End of Fiction? Property Rights
and Contract in the "Newtonian" World of On-Line Commerce, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 115,
130-35 (1997) (advocating for a shift in emphasis from prohibitive transaction costs
to redistributive values directed toward providing subsidies in the arena of creative
expression).
16 Cf Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d 1532, 1542 n.22 (11th Cir. 1996)
("Although the traditional approach is to view 'fair use' as an affirmative defense, this
writer, speaking only for himself, is of the opinion that it is better viewed as a right
granted by the Copyright Act of 1976.").
17 See, e.g., Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2003);
Sony Computer Entm't, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 602 (9th Cir. 2000)
(citing Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1527-28 (9th Cir. 1992));
Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am. Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 842-44 (Fed. Cir. 1992);
Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 270 (5th Cir. 1988).
18 Eg., Davidson & Assocs., Inc. v. Internet Gateway, 334 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1171
(E.D. Mo. 2004) ("I[Ylou shall not be entitled to . .. reverse engineer, modify, disassemble, or de-compile in whole or in part any Battle.net software." (quoting the
Terms of Use of Blizzard's gaming website)); MicRosoFr CORP., MICROSoFr SOFrwARE
LICENSE TERMS, WINDows 7 HOME BASIc § 8, available at http://download.microsoft.
com/Documents/UseTerms/Windows%207_Home%2BasicEnglish_266c7e01-34
d6-4b9a-8d43-6cc2d1d39056.pdf ("You may not . . . reverse engineer, decompile or
disassemble the software, except and only to the extent that applicable law expressly
permits, despite this limitation."); see also Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, The New Servi-
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get paradigmatic fair uses such as commentary and criticism. For
example, cases have arisen over agreements prohibiting reviews of the
copyrighted product1 9 or uses that disparage the copyright owner. 20
2.

Restricting Use of Uncopyrightable Material

By statute, copyright cannot protect certain content such as ideas,
principles, and discoveries. 2 1 In Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 22 the Supreme Court affirmed that this statutory
restriction also "prohibit[s] any copyright in facts."23 The Court held
that a compilation of preexisting facts, arranged in an uncreative way,
was ineligible for copyright protection despite the time and expense
involved in assembling the information because it did not exhibit even
a minimal degree of originality.24
More concretely, Feist established that an alphabetically arranged
white pages telephone directory could not enjoy copyright protection. 25 Such a setback would not stop the creators of telephone directories from trying to protect their creations from unauthorized
reproduction, however, and in ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, one such
effort succeeded. ProCD had created a computerized database of
tudes, 96 GEO. L.J. 885, 938 (2008) (discussing similar restrictions in Microsoft Vista's
end user license agreement).
19 See, e.g., People v. Network Assocs., Inc., 758 N.Y.S.2d 466, 467 (Sup. Ct. 2003)
(describing McAfee antivirus software's attempt to prohibit publication of users'
unauthorized reviews of the product).
20 See, e.g., Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entm't, Inc., 342 F.3d 191,
203 (3d Cir. 2003) (describing license agreement for copyrighted film trailers that
prohibited licensee from displaying the trailers on websites "derogatory to or critical
of the entertainment industry or of [Disney]" (alteration in original)); see also Lydia
Pallas Loren, Slaying the Leather-Winged Demons in the Night: Reforming Copyright Owner
Contractingwith Clickwrap Misuse, 30 OHIo N.U. L. REv. 495, 497 n.9 (2004) (observing
that Microsoft FrontPage 2002's End User License Agreement prohibits use of "the
Software in connection with any site that disparages Microsoft" (citing CmdrTaco, MS
FrontpageRestrictsFree Speech I (It's True!), SLASHDOT (Sept. 21, 2001, 11:34 AM), http:/
/www.slashdot.org/story/01 /09/21/1438251 /ms-frontpage-restricts-free-speech-ii-itstrue)).
21 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006) ("In no case does copyright protection for an
original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method
of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is
described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.").
22 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
23 Id. at 356 (citing Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S.
539, 547, 556 (1985)).
24 See id. at 363-64. The Court also emphasized that originality is a constitutional
requirement. Id. at 346.
25 See id. at 341-42.
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telephone directory information and sold CD-ROM discs that
included a version of that database, a ProCD software program, and a
shrinkwrap license which prohibited purchasers of the CD-ROM from
distributing the telephone directory information to other parties.2 6
When Matthew Zeidenberg purchased a copy of ProCD's product and
proceeded to make its telephone listings available over the Internet,
ProCD sued for copyright infringement and breach of contract.2 7
Judge Easterbrook's Seventh Circuit opinion upheld the terms of the
shrinkwrap license against challenges based on the Uniform Commercial Code and a theory of copyright preemption.2 8 Although the
court was willing to assume that ProCD's telephone directory was
uncopyrightable, 2 9 the court nevertheless enforced ProCD's attempts
to protect the directory from unauthorized copying.
3.

Restricting Resale Rights

Section 109 of the copyright statute limits the copyright owner's
exclusive right to distribute copies of the copyrighted workso in the
following respect: owners of particular copies, and persons they
authorize, may transfer ownership or possession of that copy without
obtaining permission from the copyright owner.3 1 This rule, the first
sale doctrine, declares that the copyright owner's exclusive distribution right over a particular copy is exhausted as soon as he or she sells
it for the first time.3 2 Through contract, the copyright owner may of
course place restrictions on the first purchaser of a copy, but those
restrictions cannot bind the copy's subsequent purchasers who are not
in privity with the copyright owner.3 3
26 ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 908 F. Supp. 640, 644-45 (W.D. Wis. 1996), rev'd,
86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
27 See id. at 643-44. ProCD also alleged violation of the Wisconsin Computer
Crimes Act, misappropriation, and unfair competition. See id.
28 See ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1449.
29 See id.
30 See 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (2006) (giving copyright owners the exclusive right "to
distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or
other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending").
31 Id. § 109(a). Owners of software copies or sound recordings, however, may
not lend those copies for commercial advantage. Id. § 109(b) (1) (A).
32 See, e.g., Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. L'anza Research Int'l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135,
152 (1998); Am. Int'l Pictures, Inc. v. Foreman, 576 F.2d 661, 664 (5th Cir. 1978). In
patent law, the analogous doctrine is known as patent exhaustion. See, e.g., Quanta
Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 621 (2008); Motion Picture Patents
Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 516 (1917).
33 See Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 350 (1908).
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New technology has made it easier than ever for copyright owners
to establish privity with downstream purchasers, and copyright owners
have attempted to make the most of this new ability in order to limit
secondary markets for their products. Versions of Microsoft Windows
contain end user license agreements that severely restrict consumers'
ability to transfer their copies of the software: only one transfer of the
software copy beyond the first consumer is permitted, and even that
requires the first consumer to obtain the second consumer's assent to
the license agreement beforehand.3 4 Amazon's Kindle terms of service clearly state that purchasers of Kindle e-books are prohibited
from selling, renting, or otherwise distributing their purchases to
third parties.3 5 Even where companies do not attempt to thwart first
sale rights of resale through restrictive contracts, they may make resale
"impractical" by inextricably tying use of a consumer's purchases to a
password-protected personal account.3 6 Digital goods frequently
require each installer or user's assent to the license terms, and so companies have mechanisms for establishing privity at every stage of
consumption.
Meanwhile, websites like eBay and Amazon Marketplace have
greatly facilitated secondary markets, and not all copyright owners sell
goods that are susceptible to clickwrap or account-based control of
downstream distribution. Thus record companies, which have long
placed "for promotional use only" stickers on CDs distributed to stir
up publicity for new releases, have renewed efforts to prohibit sale of
these promotional CDs. UMG Recordings sued an individual for copyright infringement because he tried to sell its promotional CDs on
eBay, having previously demanded that eBay take down the allegedly
infringing auction.3 7 Such litigation seems squarely inconsistent with
the first sale doctrine, but copyright owners like UMG have attempted
to evade the doctrine by characterizing their dispositions of copy34 See MICROSOFr CORP., supra note 18, § 18.a (reciting virtually identical restrictions on the transfer of copies of Microsoft Windows 7); Van Houweling, supra note
18, at 940 (explaining the transfer restrictions in Microsoft Vista).
35 See AMAZON.COM, KINDLE USER's GUIDE, app. B, at 13, available at http://kindle.s3.amazonaws.com/AppB_07072010_English.pdf ("Unless specifically indicated
otherwise, you may not sell, rent, lease, distribute, broadcast, sublicense, or otherwise
assign any rights to the Digital Content or any portion of it to any third party . . . .").
36 See, e.g., Ina Fried & Evan Hansen, Apple: Reselling iTunes Songs "Impractical",
CNET (Sept. 8, 2003, 2:54 PM), http://news.cnet.com/2100-1027_3-5072842.html
(quoting an Apple representative's explanation that reselling iTunes purchases,
which would require transfer of account information, would be "impractical, though
perhaps within someone's rights").
37 See UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Augusto, 558 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1058 (C.D. Cal.
2008), affd, 628 F.3d 1175 (9th Cir. 2011).
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righted material as mere licenses and not as transfers of ownership.38
Elizabeth Winston similarly describes the Maryland State Bar Association's efforts to place restrictions on its Maryland Lawyers Manuat39 :
instead of selling copies of the book, the group seals the copies in
shrinkwrap with a contract telling consumers that they, as mere licensees, may not sell, loan, or give away their copies. 40 The first sale doctrine does not apply, these copyright owners argue, without a
triggering sale of the copyrighted work. 4 1
B. Defensive Copyright Commandeering
1. Controlling Rights to Reproduce and to Distribute
Copyright owners enjoy exclusive rights to reproduce and distribute copies of their copyrighted works. 4 2 Anyone who performs
these actions without the copyright owner's permission or a valid
defense commits infringement. 43 Courts have broad authority to issue
injunctions in order to stop such infringement.4 4
In the Google Books litigation, Google endeavored to extinguish
its infringement liability going forward despite future plans to engage
in unauthorized reproduction and distribution of copyrighted books.
Google originally scanned these books in order to enable unprecedented searches of their full texts for individual research. 4 5 When the
Authors Guild and various publishers filed infringement lawsuits in
2005, Google defended its project as fair use.4 6 Over the next several
years of settlement negotiations, however, the Google Books litigation
morphed into something very different: a settlement that would not
only settle any claims arising out of Google's previous copying for the
sake of allowing users to search full texts, but that would also give
38

39
40

See id. at 1060.
BAR Ass'N, MARYLAND LAWYERS MANuAL (2011).
See Elizabeth I. Winston, Why Sell What You Can License? ContractingAround Stat-

MD. STATE

utory Protection of Intellectual Property, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 93, 94 (2006).

41 Cf Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102, 1112 (9th Cir. 2010) (accepting
this argument).
42 See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1), (3) (2006).
43 See id. § 501(a).
44 See id. § 502(a). But cf eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 394
(2006) (holding that courts may not automatically issue injunctions to remedy patent
infringement but rather must consider the appropriateness of injunctive relief using a
four-factor test).
45 See, e.g., Eric Schmidt, Editorial, Books of Revelation, WALL ST. J., Oct. 18, 2005,
at A18 (explaining the search engine intentions at the heart of "Google Print").
46 See Pamela Samuelson, Google Book Search and the Future of Books in Cyberspace, 94
MINN. L. REv. 1308, 1314-15 (2010).
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Google an ongoing right to sell users access to full texts 4 7 Google
had evidently calculated that this more ambitious settlement was a better deal from its perspective.4 8 Copyright owners who are members of
the settlement class would have been unable to sue Google for copyright infringement of implicated works,49 despite the fact that Google
intended to continue reproducing and distributing copyrighted works
for commercial gain.50 Those right-holders would have had a right,
subject to a number of highly detailed qualifications, to have their
works excluded from Google's project.5 1 Yet Google's proposal was
an opt-out regime, and so the default for out-of-print but in-copyright
works was inclusion.5 2 For the many class members who owned copyrights in orphan works, 53 the class action would essentially have given
Google a unique opportunity to use those works for commercial purposes without fear of copyright infringement liability.54 In March, the
district court rejected the proposed settlement, citing a variety of
concerns.5 5
2.

Controlling Right to Authorize Public Performance

Section 106 gives copyright owners the exclusive rights notjust to
do but also to authorize six listed actions, including public performance of their works.5 6 Attempting to authorize any of the § 106
actions without the copyright owner's permission has itself been classi47 See Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666, 671 (S.D.N.Y. 2011);
Attachment I to the Amended Settlement Agreement at 9, Authors Guild, 770 F. Supp.
2d 666 (No. 05 CV 8136-DC), available at http://thepublicindex.org/docs/amended
settlement/amended settlement.pdf.
48 Cf William B. Rubenstein, A TransactionalModel of Adjudication, 89 GEO. L.J.
371, 419 (2001) (proposing a transaction-based conception of class actions, according
to which defendants broker settlement deals in order to purchase plaintiffs' rights-tosue so they can resume ordinary business).
49 See Amended Settlement Agreement, supra note 47, §§ 10.1(f), 10.2(a).
50 See generally id. § 4 (outlining the economic terms for Google's use of books).
51 See id. § 3.5.
52 See Author's Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 680.
53 See Pamela Samuelson, Legally Speaking: The Dead Souls of the Google Book Search
Settlement, COMM. ACM, July 2009, at 28, 28 ("An estimated 70% of the books in the
Book Search repository are in-copyright, but out of print. Most of them are, for all
practical purposes, 'orphan works,' that is, works technically still in copyright, but for
which it is virtually impossible to locate the appropriate rights holders to ask for permission to digitize them.").
54 See Randall C. Picker, The Google Book Search Settlement: A New Orphan-Works
Monopoly ?, 5J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 383, 393 (2009); Samuelson, supranote 53, at
30.
55 See Authors Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 686.
56 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006).
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fied as infringement.5 7 Copyright owners, of course, may delegate
their authorization rights to others acting on their behalf.
Perhaps the oldest instance of copyright commandeering
occurred at the hands of the American Society of Composers, Authors
and Publishers (ASCAP). ASCAP was founded in 1914 precisely in
order to authorize public performance of its members' copyrighted
works so that their rights could be enforced efficiently.5 8 Until 1950,
however, ASCAP required its members to grant their public performance authorization rights exclusively to the Society, and thus prospective public performance licensees could not obtain licenses directly
from the composers but rather had to negotiate with ASCAP. 59
ASCAP's ability to control the entire market for public performance
licenses gave it enormous power in setting licensing rates, and before
too long antitrust challenges ended ASCAP's practice of collecting
exclusive rights from its members.6 0 Beside the leverage over licensees, and less frequently noted, was ASCAP's corollary leverage over its
own members. The court in Alden-Rochelle, Inc. v. American Society of
Composers, Authors & Publisherse' observed that the transfer of exclusive
rights to ASCAP restrained competition among ASCAP members. 62
ASCAP members who wanted to undercut their fellow composers'
licensing fees were unable to do so. Since ASCAP was the only organization available to enforce members' public performance rights, at
least until the founding of the Broadcasters Music, Inc. (BMI) in
1940,63 any composers who were dissatisfied with ASCAP's terms had
little choice but to assent. 64
57 See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 433
(1984).
58 See generally Robert P. Merges, Contractinginto Liability Rules: Intellectual Property
Rights and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CALIF. L. REv. 1293, 1329-30 (1996)
(describing the origins of the ASCAP); Lee C. White, Musical Copyrights v. the AntiTrust Laws, 30 NEB. L. REV. 50, 51 (1950) (explaining how individuals were "weak and
powerless" on their own).
59 See Simon H. Rifkind, Music Copyrights and Antitrust: A Turbulent Courtship, 4
CARDozo ARTs & ENT. L.J. 1, 7 (1985).
60 See Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Am. Soc'y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 620 F.2d 930, 933 (2d Cir. 1980) (characterizing 1950 amended consent decree as
prohibiting ASCAP from obtaining exclusive rights from its members or interfering
with members' ability to issue performance licenses directly); Rifkind, supra note 59,
at 10.
61 80 F. Supp. 888 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
62 Id. at 894-95.
63 See White, supra note 58, at 54.
64 See Merges, supra note 58, at 1338.
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Controlling Authorized Derivative Works

3.

Copyright owners have the exclusive right to prepare derivative
works based on their copyrighted creations, 65 but derivative works are
themselves eligible for copyright protection. 6 6 In addition to the standard prerequisites for copyright eligibility,6 7 the derivative work
author's use of the underlying work must not be "unlawful."68 The
law is notoriously unclear, however, when it comes to determining
whether follow-on creation is the kind of "transformation" 69 that
requires permission because it creates a derivative work or the kind
that needs no permission because it qualifies as fair use. 70 Nor is it
often clear when a follow-on creator has created an infringing derivative work using a preexisting work's copyrighted expressive content as
opposed to only using its uncopyrightable ideas.7 1
65

17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2006).

66 Id. § 103(a).
67 Circuits differ widely in their tests for minimal originality in derivative works.
See, e.g., Entm't Research Grp., Inc. v. Genesis Creative Grp., Inc., 122 F.3d 1211, 1219
(9th Cir. 1997) (stating that characteristics of derivative works originality test depend
on whether the underlying work is in the public domain or itself subject to copyright); Gracen v. Bradford Exch., 698 F.2d 300, 305 (7th Cir. 1983) ("[A] derivative
work must be substantially different from the underlying work to be copyrightable.");
L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 490 (2d Cir. 1976) (en banc) (requiring
a "low threshold" for originality such that "more than a 'merely trivial' variation" on a
preexisting work will suffice (quoting Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191
F.2d 99, 103 (2d Cir. 1951))).
68 17 U.S.C. § 103(a); cf H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 58 (1976) (noting that unauthorized use of a preexisting work would be not be "unlawful" for purposes of
§ 103(a) if it qualified as a fair use).
69 As noted earlier, see supra note 13 and accompanying text, transformative use
of copyrighted material is likely to be declared fair use. But the copyright statute's
definition of derivative works itself encompasses any "form in which a work may be
recast, transformed, or adapted." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (emphasis added).
70 To get a sense of how difficult it can be to understand when courts will hold a
creative follow-on work fair use instead of infringement, compare Suntrust Bank v.
Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1277 (11th Cir. 2001), which credited the fair use
defense offered on behalf of The Wind Done Gone, Alice Randall's critical retelling of
Gone with the Wind from the perspective of the enslaved half-sister of Scarlett O'Hara,
with Salinger v. Colting, 641 F. Supp. 2d 250, 256-60 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), vacated on other
grounds,607 F.3d 68, 83 (2d Cir. 2010), which rejected the fair use defense offered on
behalf of Fredrik Colting's 60 Years Later: Coming Through the Rye, a novel purportedly
using a 76-year-old approximation of Holden Caulfield to comment critically on The
Catcher in the Rye.
71 A work based partly on preexisting works must borrow expression and not only
ideas to qualify as an infringing derivative work. See, e.g., Reyher v. Children's Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87, 90-93 (2d Cir. 1976) (holding that a book's copyright
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Given this legal uncertainty and the enormous costs of defending
an infringement lawsuit, users of preexisting works are wise to acquire
a license rather than take their chances with a fair use defense. Other
writers have discussed how copyright's uncertainties generate a "clearance culture" where it is customary for users of copyrighted works to
buy licenses that, as a legal matter, they do not need. 72 But tendering
payment is only one form that risk-conscious surrender can take. In
the case of potentially profitable derivative works, some right-holders
might prefer instead the licensee's surrender of future copyright
interests in the new work. Lawrence Lessig describes several examples
of this practice in his book, Remix. David Bowie's website, for
instance, ran remixing contests that required remixers to assign away
all interests in their creations, including by granting Bowie's record
label a royalty-free license to use content from the remix that did not
derive from Bowie's own work.7 3 Similarly, Lucasfilm websites offered
to host Star Wars-related content created by the franchise's fans, but
the websites' terms of service reminded remixers of Lucasfilm's exclusive right to prepare derivative works and claimed intellectual property rights in any derivative works that users uploaded.7 4 Again, the
demand for control covered not just the aspects of the derivative
works that derived from the licensor's own creations, but all the copyrightable content that the fans had incorporated into those derivative
works, even if wholly original.75
was not infringed because a subsequent story presented only the same ideas and did
not also copy expression). Landes and Posner write:
Although the line between expression and idea is often hazy, there are clear
cases on both sides of it. If an author of spy novels copies a portion of an Ian
Fleming novel aboutJames Bond, he is an infringer. If, inspired by Fleming,
he decides to write a novel about a British secret agent who is a bon vivant,
he is not an infringer.
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J.
LEGAL STUD. 325, 349 (1989). But even their purportedly clear case is not. See MetroGoldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 900 F. Supp. 1287, 1298 (C.D. Cal.
1995) (granting preliminary injunction for infringement of James Bond by a Honda
commercial because "both hero[e]s are young, tuxedo-clad, British-looking men with
beautiful women in tow and grotesque villains close at hand[,] ... exude uncanny
calm under pressure, exhibit a dry sense of humor and wit, and are attracted to, and
are attractive to, their female companions").
72 See PATRICIA AUFDERHEIDE & PETER JASZI, CTR. FOR Soc. MEDIA, UNTOLD STORIEs 22 (2004), available at http://www.centerforsocialmedia.org/sites/default/files/
UNTOLDSTORIESReport.pdf.
73 See LAWRENCE LESSIG, REMIx 244 (2008).
74 Id. at 245-46.
75 Id. at 246.
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This last example of commandeering shows the limitations of the
offensive/defensive distinction. David Bowie and Lucasfilm were not
cleanly on either side of the creator/user divide. As licensors, they
wore their right-holding creator hats, legitimately exercising their prerogative as copyright owners to authorize derivative works. But simultaneous with their authorizing the derivative works, they engaged in a
sort of defensive commandeering by taking control of copyrights that
arose because of the genuinely creative acts of others who were not,
after all, their agents. Those individuals were likewise creators in one
respect and users in another.7 6 This complicated relationship
between creator-users and the legal mechanism deployed in itnamely authorization conditioned on surrender of future copyright
interests-also appears, surprisingly enough, where the Creative Commons "ShareAlike" license is used. There are a variety of Creative
Commons licenses, but the ShareAlike license is unique for a condition it imposes: "If you alter, transform, or build upon this work, you
may distribute the resulting work only under the same or similar
license to this one."77 There are, of course, important differences
between Creative Commons and the examples that Lessig discusses.
The ShareAlike license assumes control of the derivative works copyright only to open up access to the work, whereas the other entities do
so presumably to turn a profit by controlling access. From an ethical
standpoint, this difference may be crucial.7 But in both cases, the
authorization to prepare a derivative work comes on the condition
that the preparer cede some of his or her copyright entitlements in
the resulting work on the authorizer's preferred terms.
That is not, obviously, to say that the practices must stand or fall
together. On the contrary, the normative lesson to be taken away
from this comparison, and indeed from this entire Part of the Article,
is that the justifiability of commandeering practices cannot be settled
at a superficial level. For diverse actors engage in those practices for a
variety of purposes. Whatever criterion we ultimately use to evaluate
76 See, e.g., Mary W.S. Wong, "Transformative" User-Generated Content in Copyight
Law: Infringing Derivative Works or Fair Use?, 11 VAND. J. Er. & TECH. L. 1075, 1092
(2009) (suggesting that derivative works creators be viewed as both users and
authors).
77 Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported, CREATIVE COMMONS, http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2012).
78 Lessig suggests that the Lucasfilm strategy evinces a lack of respect for the
remixer's work. LESSIG, supra note 73, at 247. I am not convinced that suggestion is
right, since the strategy acknowledges the remix's ability to generate revenue and,
hence, at least one kind of value. But the moral status of what Lessig calls "sharecropping" is a question beyond the scope of this Article. See id. at 243-44.
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these practices, there can be no guarantee at the outset that it will
yield a uniform set of verdicts for each practice. If courts are to handle commandeering in a way that makes sense of existing copyright
laws and that benefits society, deeper investigation is needed. The
remainder of this Article therefore focuses on identifying the considerations that should govern normative analysis of copyright
commandeering.
II.

THREE OVERBROAD ARGUMENTS AGAINST COMMANDEERING

In this Part, I examine previous arguments against commandeering, which usually have focused on instances of what I have been
calling offensive commandeering. These arguments have typically
accompanied specific doctrinal proposals for restricting commandeering. I argue that although the following lines of attack raise some
legitimate worries about commandeering, they and their accompanying doctrinal prescriptions are overly broad.
A.

Legislative Intent and Copyright's Delicate Balance

A common argument against various examples of commandeering leans heavily on Congress's perceived design for copyright
law. Perhaps inspired by frequent judicial reference to copyright's
goal of balancing the interests of creators and users,7 9 innumerable
commentators have trumpeted the balance embodied in copyright
law. Thus David Nimmer, Elliot Brown, and Gary Frischling write:
[T]he copyright laws are designed to achieve a "delicate balance"
between the rights of copyright proprietors and copyright users.
This balance is disrupted when state [contract] law is permitted to
79

See, e.g., Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 228 (1990) ("[T]he Act creates a bal-

ance between the artist's right to control the work during the term of the copyright
protection and the public's need for access to creative works."); Sony Corp. of Am. v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (explaining that Congress's constitutionally prescribed task "involves a difficult balance between the interests of
authors and inventors in the control and exploitation of their writings and discoveries
on the one hand, and society's competing interest in the free flow of ideas, information, and commerce on the other hand"); Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken,
422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) ("The limited scope of the copyright holder's statutory
monopoly, like the limited copyright duration required by the Constitution, reflects a
balance of competing claims upon the public interest: Creative work is to be
encouraged and rewarded, but private motivation must ultimately serve the cause of
promoting broad public availability of literature, music, and the other arts." (footnote
omitted)).
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enlarge the rights of copyright proprietors at the expense of copyright users.80
This description of mass licensing seems to capture the mainstream view among copyright scholars. Niva Elkin-Koren agrees "that
rights granted under copyright law reflect a delicate balance between
an owner's monopoly and a user's privilege to access information."8 1
Michael Madison criticizes ProCD'svalidation of restrictive licenses for
promoting the idea that the copyright balance "is a question of purely
private definition." 8 2 Julie Cohen voices the same concern about the
treatment of mass licenses by the Uniform Computer Information
Transactions Act, which was originally written to be Article 2B of the
Uniform Commercial Code until the American Law Institute came
out in opposition.8 3 Some scholars disapprove of the balance that
Congress has legislated because of the ways that it already favors rightholders,8 4 but even these critics usually agree that enforcing the current balance is preferable to allowing any significant amount of private contractual reordering.8 5 The academic community has also
largely concurred in Nimmer and his co-authors' doctrinal prescription-that is, that state contract law should be preempted where it
yields results inconsistent with copyright's delicate balance 8 680 David Nimmer et al., The Metamorphosis of Contract into Expand, 87 CALIF. L. REV.
17, 22-23 (1999).
81 Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyright Policy and the Limits of Freedom of Contract, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 93, 101 (1997); see also Mark A. Lemley, Beyond Preemption: The Law and
Policy of Intellectual Property Licensing, 87 CALIF. L. REv. 111, 142 (1999) ("Copyright is
not a system of absolute property rights. It is 'a scheme of carefully balanced property
rights that give authors and their publishers sufficient inducements to produce and
disseminate original creative works and, at the same time, allow others to draw on
these works in their own creative and educational activities.'" (quoting I PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT 1:40 (2d ed. 1998))).
82 Michael J. Madison, Legal-Ware: Contract and Copyright in the DigitalAge, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 1025, 1092 (1998).
83 SeeJulie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy of "Rights
Management", 97 MICH. L. REv. 462, 534-35 (1998); Dorte Toft, Opponents Blast Proposed U.S. Software Law, CNN.com, (July 12, 1999, 11:54 AM), http://www.cnn.com/
TECH/computing/9907/12/ucita.idg/index.html (describing ALI's withdrawal of
support).
84 See, e.g., Madison, supra note 82, at 1079; MargaretJane Radin, Regime Change
in Intellectual Property: Superseding the Law of the State with the "Law" of the Firm, 1 U.
OrTAWA L. & TECH. J. 173, 178 (2003-2004).
85 See, e.g., Radin, supra note 84, at 178.
86 See Nimmer et al., supra note 80, at 53; see also Dennis S. Karjala, FederalPreemption of Shrinkwrap and On-Line Licenses, 22 U. DAYTON L. REv. 511, 541 (1997) (arguing
for preemption); Viva R. Moffat, Super-Copyright: Contracts, Preemption, and the Structure
of Copyright Policymaking, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 45, 92-95 (2007) (same). Most scholars who discuss copyright preemption, including Nimmer and co-authors, make argu-
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although perhaps not quite to the same extent as they have concurred
in the diagnosis that balance-disturbing is a serious problem.
Courts, by contrast, have been largely unreceptive to these arguments. Although some courts have declined to enforce mass licenses
for other reasons,8 7 no court has held that state law contract law is
generally preempted by the copyright statute when used to enforce
commandeering mass licenses. 88 Overall, today's courts are likely to
enforce terms of use provisions8 9 and unlikely to contemplate copyright's delicate balance as they reach their decision.
While it is fair to fault some courts for not even considering the
possibility that the Copyright Act impliedly preempts state contract
law enforcement of certain mass licenses,9 0 it is much harder to identify the precise position of copyright's delicate balance than scholarship in this area typically suggests. It is clear that copyright law seeks
to strike a balance, but at any useful level of detail, the characteristics
of the balance actually struck, including the relevant purposes of federal copyright law, are far from transparent. Therefore, determining
ments based on implied, Supremacy Clause preemption (also called "conflict
preemption" or "obstacle preemption") as well as on the copyright statute's express
preemption provision. See 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2006). In this section, I focus on
implied preemption arguments, which seem more apposite to the "delicate balance"
metaphor. See, e.g., Nimmer et al., supra note 80, at 46 ("[Rleference to copyright's
'delicate balance' adverts to general preemption under the Supremacy Clause .. . .").
Below, in Part III.C, I address arguments that align more naturally with express
preemption.
87 E.g., Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91, 102 (3d Cir. 1991)
(declaring box-top license ineffectual under U.C.C. § 2-207).
88 One case did declare that the copyright statute preempted a state law, the Louisiana Software License Enforcement Act, which ensured that certain mass licenses
terms, including terms at odds with federal copyright law, would be "deemed to have
been accepted." See Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 269 n.28 (5th
Cir. 1988) (quoting LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 51:1964). The court apparently assumed,
however, that the mass license would not have been valid under regular state contract
law and could only have been enforceable pursuant to the special state statute. See id.
at 269; see also Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 655 F. Supp. 750, 761 (E.D. La.
1987), affd, 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988) ("The license agreement contained in the
[software] package is a contract of adhesion which could only be enforceable if the
Louisiana Software License Enforcement Act . .. is a valid and enforceable statute.").
So this case did not exactly establish that enforcing license agreements through regular state contract law would be preempted.
89 See Mark A. Lemley, Tenns of Use, 91 MINN. L. REV. 459, 459-60 (2006). But cf
Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 979 (4th Cir. 1990) (recognizing copyright misuse defense on account of license's anticompetitive language).
90 See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 81, at 143 n.138 ("There is simply no arguable
justification for the court's refusal even to discuss conflicts preemption in the case
before it.").
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which contractual provisions are inconsistent with congressional copyright policy is not a trivial matter.
For starters, the Copyright Act's structure is unhelpful. As far as
contractual reassignment of copyright entitlements is concerned, the
Act viewed as a whole exhibits the same sort of ambiguity as the Rubin
vase, which some perceive as a white figure against a black ground
while others detect the silhouette of two human faces staring at each
other against a white background. 9 ' Perceptions of the Copyright
Act's Gestalt vary in a similar manner. When some view copyright law
as a whole, they see a set of creator rights that are circumscribed by
various limits in the form of specified uses that need no permission
from the right-holder. Others view the statute's figure as a delineation of many different entitlements that can be the objects of mutually
beneficial exchanges. The statute simply does not resolve the fundamental disagreement between the two camps, which is about whether
the alienation of users' privileges is permitted in the same way as the
alienation of copyright owners' rights. 9 2
The purposes behind various statutory provisions offer no better
guidance. Whether the contracting away of fair use rights, for example, comports with copyright's purposes will vary depending on
whether one thinks the purpose of fair use is to safeguard freedom of
speech or to correct for market failure.9 3 Even the seemingly uncontroversial characterization of copyright law, as intentionally leaving
certain material in the public domain, 94 contains a degree of ambiguity that matters when viewing restrictive licenses like the one at issue
in ProCD. As James Boyle explains, one can think of the public
domain in a few ways, such as consisting only of creative works that are
entirely unprotected, or as further including aspects of works that
members of the public are free to use notwithstanding the copyright
protection covering other aspects of the works, or finally as encompassing everything that members of the public can take without needing to seek prior permission.9 5 Where creative works are part of a
91 See generally Ernest Glen Wever, Figureand Ground in the Visual PerceptionofForm,
38 AM. J. PSYCHOL. 194 (1927) (discussing perception of the Rubin vase).
92 See, e.g., Radin, supra note 84, at 179.
93 See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
94 See, e.g.,Jason Mazzone, Coyfraud, 81 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1026, 1059 (2006) ("The
Constitution strikes a delicate balance between supporting authorship and protecting
speech by permitting copyrights only for 'limited Times.' Publishers upset that balance when they interfere with uses of public domain materials." (footnote omitted)
(quoting U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 8)).
95 See James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Constructionof the Public
Domain, 66 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBs., Winter/Spring 2003, at 33, 59-62 ("There is not
one public domain, but many.").
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commons secured by liability rules like contract damages rather than
property rules like copyright's statutory damages or injunctions,9 6 they
are free for others to use in one sense but not in another. They are
not free inasmuch as they cannot be accessed at no cost, but they are
free inasmuch as they are free from any right-holder's monopolistic
efforts to stifle would-be competition.9 7
It would be tempting to sort through these rival interpretations of
U.S. copyright law by consulting an authoritative expression of legislative intent,98 but for the most part the relevant legislative history is
inscrutable. As others have noted, an early draft of the preemption
provisions of the 1976 Act provided:
Nothing in this title annuls or limits any rights or remedies under
the common law or statutes of any State with respect to . .. activities
violating legal or equitable rights that are not equivalent to any of
the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by section 106, including . . . breaches of contract ....

99

Commenting on this passage, the House Judiciary Committee
wrote, "Nothing in the bill derogates from the rights of parties to contract with each other and to sue for breaches of contract. . . ." oo This

legislative history would pose a serious challenge to arguments that
contract-based commandeering should be preempted as inconsistent with Congress's purposes, but of course this statutory language was not included in the final version that was enacted into law,
and no one knows exactly why.10 1 It is no wonder that courts have
96 See generally Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability
Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. REv. 1089 (1972) (proposing a general framework for analyzing legal entitlements in terms of the manner
in which they are protected). I discuss copyright and contract remedies at greater
length in Part III.B below.
97 See Boyle, supra note 95, at 63 ("If our concern is monopolistic control over
choke-points imposed by the will of others, freedom from others 'telling us what we
can do,' then the norm of freedom we will seek to instantiate in property's outside,
whether we describe it as a public domain or a commons, is a norm of non-discriminatory access.").
98 See, e.g., Moffat, supra note 86, at 70.
99 S. 22, 94th Cong. § 301(b) (as reported by H. Comm. on the judiciary, Sept. 3,
1976).
100 H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 132 (1976).
101 Jennifer Rothman explains:
There is debate over why this language was deleted. There is a suggestion in
the record that it was struck because it would have destroyed the intent of
Section 301 by failing to preempt state laws which interfered with copyright
law, such as the right of publicity. Other parts of the legislative record, however, suggest another reason the language was struck. Some members of
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refused to seek guidance from legislative history this "puzzling and
unreliable."10 2
Nor did Congress's intentions prove unambiguously opposed to
commandeering over time. As Nimmer and co-authors point out,
Representative Rick Boucher introduced a bill that would have vindicated the delicate balance that they already saw in the Copyright
Act. 103 The Boucher proposal would have amended the preemption
provision so as to include the following:
When a work is distributed to the public subject to non-negotiable
license terms, such terms shall not be enforceable . . . to the extent

that they(1) limit the reproduction, adaptation, distribution, performance,
or display, by means of transmission or otherwise, of material that is
uncopyrightable under section 102(b) or otherwise; or
(2) abrogate or restrict the limitations on exclusive rights specified
in sections 107 through 114 and sections 117 and 118 of this tide.1 04
But this proposal died in committee, and Congress instead
enacted the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) ,105 which
made no effort to protect users' privileges through curbs on contractual reassignment of them.1 0 6 Given the proposal and subsequent
Congress thought the language was unnecessary since it was obvious that
certain state rights, such as the right of publicity, would not be preempted.
Jennifer E. Rothman, Copyright Preemption and the Right of Publicity, 36 U.C. DAVIs L.
REv. 199, 235 (2002) (footnote omitted).
102 Architectronics, Inc. v. Control Sys., Inc., 935 F. Supp. 425, 440 (S.D.N.Y.
1996).
103 Nimmer et al., supra note 80, at 72 & n.237.
104 Digital Era Copyright Enhancement Act, H.R. 3048, 105th Cong. § 7 (1997).
105 Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 17 U.S.C.). Both bills were proposed in large part to satisfy U.S. obligations under the WIPO treaties, especially concerning circumvention of technological
measures protecting access to copyrighted works and alteration of rights management
information. Rep. Boucher's bill, however, included the preemption provisions as
well as various other proposals for updating copyright law in response to technological advances. For background and comparison of the two bills and their relatives, see
DOROTHY SCHRADER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., "DiciTAL ERA COPYRIGHT ENHANCEMENT
ACT" 3048 (1998).
106 To the contrary, the DMCA's anti-circumvention measures are widely criticized
for striking a balance that too heavily tilts in the favor of content industries and
against users. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, IntellectualProperty and the DigitalEconomy:
Why the Anti-Circumvention Regulations Need to Be Revised, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 519,
562-63 (1999) ("The anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA ... are unpredictable, overbroad, inconsistent, and complex. The many flaws in this legislation are
likely to be ... harmful to the public's broader interests in being able to make fair
and other noninfringing uses of copyrighted works.").
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rejection of Representative Boucher's bill, which would have undone
ProCD and subsequent case law, it is very difficult to maintain today
that courts have generally erred in not preempting contractual reassignment of copyright entitlements on grounds of conflict with statu10 7
tory purposes.o
Because there is no clearer evidence about commandeering's
inconsistency with copyright's delicate balance,judges have been right
to hesitate before preempting state contract law on that basis. Still,
there remains some intuitive appeal in the thought that Congress,
when parceling out entitlements between creators and users in significant detail, was not merely offering its own suggestions about what
arrangements might work. Yet in wielding the blunt instrument of
preemption to vindicate this intuition,1 0 8 courts must exercise caution. There is no incontrovertible characterization of copyright law's
delicate balance on the subject of transfers of initial entitlements. To
figure out what forms of commandeering, if any, ought to be preempted, courts should rely on other sorts of considerations.
B.

Complexity and Information Costs

By massively altering the allocation of copyright entitlements,
commandeering complicates individuals' legal privileges and responsibilities with respect to copyrighted goods. Relatively new digital
mechanisms like clickwrap and browsewrap licenses enable right-holders to disseminate their preferred complications on a scale that was
previously impossible. In the past, copyright owners could not easily
contract with downstream users, but today the privity possibilities are
literally endless. Although the complexity presumably enhances the
welfare of those who draft the contracts that create it, several scholars
have argued that the complexity simultaneously imposes significant
costs.
Because information is essential in any transaction, parties generally want to acquire as much information as they can until the costs of
gathering it exceed the benefits. The benefits provided by information partly depend on the parties' valuation of the assets being
exchanged. Thus buyers are unlikely to expend a lot of effort acquir107 Cf Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 489-90 (1940) (explaining that a
judicial statutory interpretation may be presumed correct "where after the matter has
been fully brought to the attention of the public and the Congress, the latter has not
seen fit to change the statute").
108 Cf Lemley, supra note 81, at 145 ("Using preemption doctrine against contracts is something like swinging a sledgehammer at a gnat: you are likely to hit the
target, but you may do some serious damage to the things around it.").
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ing information in small-value transactions.10 9 Compared to real
property, which is not only more expensive but also more easily
demarcated, the marginal costs of seeking further information about
products that embody intellectual property are likely to be relatively
high."1 0 Not only are such products typically of lower value, but their
boundaries are determined by legal doctrines that are already fuzzy
and unpredictable. But nevertheless those doctrines can give consumers a baseline set of expectations that commandeering unsettles.
Recently, Molly Van Houweling has criticized some mass licenses for
imposing information costs by making rights to use copyrighted works
more complex."' She expresses special concern over licenses that
restrict all users of the works, dubbing such licenses "the new servitudes" because of the sense in which they can be said to run with
12
property to restrict even very remote, downstream parties.'
Of course, the new servitudes do not all increase information
costs to the same extent. Assessing a particular license's information
cost problems requires a basis for comparison. Terms of service that
pop up every time software is installed at least have the virtue of reliably providing users with notice." 3 Thus information costs in this area
4
often arise from want of attention rather than want of information."1
Even when users have the ability to read a license's terms, most
quickly click through rather than spend time trying to understand
them.'" 5 But licenses do not have to be complicated, as Creative Commons has shown by explaining its various licenses in simple, userfriendly terms."16 Moreover, not all licenses unsettle users' expecta109 See, e.g., Glen 0. Robinson, PersonalProperty Seroitudes, 71 U. CHm. L. Riv. 1449,
1486 (2004) ("[T]he rational buyer will invest in information about a good ... only
up to the point where marginal gains equal marginal cost. For low-valued goods this
investment would be very low.").
110 See, e.g., Van Houweling, supra note 18, at 932-33.
111 See id. at 932-39.
112 Id. at 933, 935.
113 Cf Richard A. Epstein, Notice and Freedom of Contract in the Law of Servitudes, 55
S. CAL. L. REv. 1353, 1357 (1982) (emphasizing the importance of providing notice in
a system of servitudes).
114 See Henry E. Smith, Institutions and Indirectness in IntellectualProperty, 157 U. PA.
L. REv. 2083, 2121 (2009) (citing Herbert A. Simon, Designing Organizationsfor an
Information-Rich World, in COMPUTERS, COMMUNICATION, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 37,
40-41 (Martin Greenberger ed., 1971)).
115 See Van Houweling, supra note 18, at 934.
116 But even user-friendly licenses feature the occasional opaque term-including,
most notably, Creative Commons's "noncommercial," the meaning of which has
sparked considerable discussion. See generally CREATIVE COMMONS, DEFINING "NONCOMMERCIAL" 72-75 (2009), available at http://mirrors.creativecommons.org/defining-noncommercial/DefiningNoncommercialfullreport.pdf (presenting surveys of
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tions to the same degree. Ultimately, it is an empirical question how
much any given license compounds the user's information burdens.
Van Houweling nonetheless proposes an a priori rule of thumb
for determining whether a license imposes a problematic level of
information costs. She suggests using copyright's default entitlement
assignment as a baseline for evaluating the relative costliness of
license-based complexity: those restrictions that go beyond the restrictions imposed on users by copyright law itself will be more costly
because they impose new obligations that contravene users' preexisting beliefs about what they are permitted to do.11 7 Van Houweling
suggests that the Creative Commons attribution requirement does not
complicate matters at all, for it merely abandons the copyright
owner's exclusive rights to reproduce, to distribute, or to prepare
derivative works on the sole condition that the original work be attributed to its author.' 18 The licensee in this scenario seems to be getting
quite a lot in the license in exchange for comparatively little, and the
terms of this exchange are clearly spelled out.
Van Houweling's suggestion, however, must be qualified in two
ways. First, her distinction presumes that it has already been settled
exactly what "behavior ... the background law leaves unregulated,"' 1 9
yet often in commandeering litigation one cannot invoke such a distinction without begging the question. Such cases are attempting to
settle exactly what behavior is left unregulated by copyright law. For
example, Van Houweling contrasts the Creative Commons attribution
requirement with software licenses that limit resale, arguing that the
latter departs from the copyright baseline by prohibiting behavior that
would otherwise be permitted under the first sale doctrine. 120 But
courts have upheld such restrictions as fully consistent with the first
sale doctrine, determining that the software had been merely licensed
and not sold. 1 2 ' Since background copyright law, at least according to
these courts, prohibits the resale of such software, licenses that permit
resale only on certain specified conditions do not depart from copyright's baseline any more than do licenses permitting duplication only
if attribution is retained. As I argue below, it is frequently implausible
content users' and creators' understanding of "noncommercial" and finding points of
agreement as well as a few differences of opinion).
117 See Van Houweling, supra note 18, at 936-39.
118 Id. at 936-37; see also CREATIVE COMMONS, supra note 77 ("You must attribute
the work in the manner specified by the author or licensor .....
119 Van Houweling, supra note 18, at 939.
120 See id. at 936-38.
121 See, e.g., Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2010).
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to characterize software transactions as mere licenses and not sales,12 2
but any argument against such a characterization has to be independent of copyright law's baseline on pain of circularity: it is precisely
that baseline that is in dispute in such cases. Thus while talk of departures from copyright's default is useful as a rough and ready way to
identify a certain practice as commandeering, it cannot do real work
in legal disputes about the permissibility of that practice. 123
The other necessary qualification is that information costs are not
licensees' only concern. From the consumer's perspective, the magnitude of information costs depends on how much she values that information. For any given license, the fact that its complex terms would
escape a user's attention might be a problem caused by insufficiently
salient restrictions, or it might be an indication that the complexitycreating term valued by right-holders does not implicate the average
user's foremost concerns. The latter interpretation would be especially plausible if it turned out that such limitations resulted in lower
prices. Whether there is in fact any such complexity/purchase price
trade-off is a difficult, and again empirical, question. 124 But it should
not be assumed that users care very deeply about possessing the information necessary to determine everything that they may do lawfully
with copies of copyrighted works. 125
Even assuming that information costs on licensees are a serious
problem, it is not obvious what the general solution should be. Van
Houweling does not advance a concrete doctrinal proposal for how
the legal system should respond to information costs, but she does
mention the common law's tactic for reducing information costs in
the context of tangible property transfers. 126 Here she draws on the
122 See infra notes 303-08 and accompanying text.
123 Another way to avoid circularity concerns would be to modify Van Houweling's
proposal so that it rests on a wholly factual, as opposed to legal, inquiry by looking for
departures from what users believe to be copyright's baseline. Such a modification
would need refinement; I offer one possibility in Part III.B below.
124 See Cohen, supra note 83, at 520; cf Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith,
Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE
L.J. 1, 28 (2000) (noting the difficulty in identifying information costs borne by a
transacting party that are not reflected in the price term of the exchange).
125 Of course, many would view this lack of caring as itself cause for concern. See,
e.g., Cohen, supra note 83, at 554-55 (discussing the danger that consumers' "acculturation to the status quo" will exacerbate their proclivity not to demand concessions
from copyright owners). This concern, however, is concern not over complexity's
costs for individuals who agree to be bound by complex terms, but rather over its
social effects. I discuss externalities-based criticisms of commandeering in Part II.C
below and return to information cost externalities in Part III.C.
126 See Van Houweling, supra note 18, at 897-98.
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work of Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith, who have argued that the
common law's numerus clausus principle acts to reduce information
costs through standardization-that is, by declining to recognize idiosyncratic transfers of property and instead limiting transacting parties
to "a fixed menu of options from which deviations will not be permitted."12 7 Although Merrill and Smith do not focus on information
costs borne by parties to the original transaction (or their successors
in interest), a numerus clausus standardized menu of property forms
could certainly serve to reduce information costs for those individuals.
Yet it is hard to imagine numerus clausus as a cure for copyright's
information cost problems. Courts would be not only reluctant but
also ill-equipped to devise a menu of standardized copyright interests.1 28 Congress would be a more appropriate institution for undertaking any standardization task-or perhaps an administrative body
like the Copyright Office 2 9-but it would face some daunting challenges. As a mandatory, fixed menu, a copyright numerus clausus
would need to ensure that it does not prevent (or chill) value-creating
exchanges that place assets in the hands of those who value them
most. A list of copyright interests should be designed carefully to optimize the tradeoff between transactional freedom and information
costs.o30 In any event, it is also hard to imagine Congress seizing the
initiative on this front. To date, its only gesture toward embracing an
intellectual property numerus clausus has been to limit the categories
of intellectual property rights to copyrights, patents, trademarks, and
arguably trade secrets by preempting state efforts to create other varieties."' Since 1976, moreover, it has granted copyright holders broad
abilities to fragment their copyright interests into smaller parts.132
And by simultaneously abolishing copyright's preexisting formality
requirements, such as providing copyright notice on copies of the
127 Merrill & Smith, supra note 124, at 23.
128 Cf id. at 60-66 (describing advantages that legislatures have over courts in
developing a standardized menu of property interests).
129 Congress has given the Librarian of Congress authority to establish exceptions
to the DMCA's anticircumvention provisions for likely noninfringing uses of the copyrighted works. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (1) (B)-(C) (2006).
130 Cf Stephen R. Munzer, The Commons and the Anticommons in the Law and Theory
of Property, in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY
148, 157 (Martin P. Golding & William A. Edmundson eds., 2005) ("Optimality
requires not only a limit on the number of types of property. It also requires that the
types be individually well crafted and that they hang together well as a whole.").
131 See Merrill & Smith, supra note 124, at 19-20.
132 The 1976 Copyright Act abolished its predecessor's prohibition on the divisibility of copyrights. 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 10.01 (2006).
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works, Congress has shown little sensitivity to information cost
problems in copyright law.13 3 In sum, information costs do pose a
legitimate theoretical concern, but it is very difficult to determine how
pressing the concern is in fact or what should be done about it.
C.

Externalities and Social Welfare

As discussed above, opponents of commandeering often object to
treating users' privileges as alienable. A typical economic justification
for making entitlements inalienable is that the alienation would
decrease social welfare by imposing costs on third parties. Because
the transacting parties do not internalize these negative effects, the
transaction terms cannot be presumed to account for them.13 4 If
third-party costs, or negative externalities, outweigh the benefits that
the transacting parties gain from trading entitlements, the trade is
inefficient because it decreases net social welfare. This line of reasoning appears in certain arguments against commandeering: even on
the assumption that clicking through license agreements evinces the
user's assent to transfer away her entitlements, such transfers should
be prohibited where they generate sufficiently high negative externalities. 135 These negative externalities might include direct costs on
third parties or benefits that third parties must forgo as a result of the
commandeering. Given the character of creative works and information, it is reasonable to suspect that private exchanges will have significant external effects, especially in the aggregate. But it is hard to
investigate such suspicions in the abstract. So to determine exactly
what commandeering's external effects are likely to be, it is necessary
to examine specific examples.
Consider one variety of offensive commandeering, attempts to
restrict fair uses such as criticism of the work. At a glance, this kind of
commandeering seems to generate significant external costs by
impeding future innovation. Creators constantly draw upon preexisting cultural elements, whether consciously or not. One of the strongest reasons for a healthy public domain is that widespread access to
expression as well as to ideas helps to promote further creative
advances.13 6 The fair use doctrine is defensible on similar grounds.
133 See Christopher Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 STAN. L. REv. 485,
494-97 (2004) (discussing how the 1976 copyright reforms have made it harder to
acquire information about right-holders' identity by ceasing to condition copyright
protection on official registration of the work).
134 See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 96, at 1111.
135 See Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyrights in Cyberspace-Rights Without Laws, 73 CHI.KENT L. REV. 1155, 1197-99 (1998); Van Houweling, supra note 18, at 946-49.
136 SeeJessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 968 (1990).
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As noted above, transformative uses are among the most likely to be
categorized as fair.1 37 This aspect of the law makes perfect sense since
transformative uses produce new value beyond that contained in the
underlying work itself, and therefore transformative fair uses can benefit society.1 38 Fair use doctrine also helps counteract the difficulty
that individuals who create transformative works have in earning recompense that approximates the benefit society receives.' 39 From society's perspective, this difficulty means that such users would tend to
undervalue fair use if they had to negotiate with copyright owners for
permission to engage in the use. The privilege to make fair use of
copyrighted works lowers the would-be transformer's costs. Yet commandeering resurrects the undervaluation problem: if the user undervalues a contemplated fair use, she may be excessively willing to
bargain away her right to make fair uses in the future. The timing of
commandeering may compound this problem given that restrictive
licenses typically ask users to contract away their fair use rights when
they first access copies of the work. At that point in time, however, the
user may not yet have any concrete plans to make fair use of the work.
For example, the creative insight to lampoon some piece of software
may arrive only after first-hand experience of how dreadful it is. If the
user has already contracted away his fair use privilege, his decision
whether to proceed with the fair use must weigh the hassle of renegotiating with the commandeering right-holder (or the risk of proceeding with the fair use despite the contractual prohibition) against the
difficulty of internalizing the benefits that the fair use would create.
Bargaining away copyright law's default grant of fair use privileges can
thus chill value-creating fair uses in a way that affects society and not
just the parties to the agreement.
On the other hand, another variety of offensive commandeering,
restricting first sale rights, has the potential to yield positive externalities. William W. Fisher has argued that resale restrictions enable price
discrimination, which itself can be socially beneficial because it can
increase access to copyrighted works. 140 Since copyright's exclusivity
allows copyright owners to price their products substantially above the
marginal cost of production (at least where there are few acceptable
137 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
138 See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) ("Like
less ostensibly humorous forms of criticism, [parody] can provide social benefit, by
shedding light on an earlier work, and, in the process, creating a new one.").
139 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property
Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 1056-58, 73 (1997).
140 William W. Fisher III, Property and Contract on the Internet, 73 CHI.-KENr L. REV.
1203, 1234-40 (1998).
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substitutes) those consumers who would have purchased the product
at a price nearer to its marginal cost of production will instead be
priced out of the market. Yet these consumers were willing to pay
more for the product than it cost the copyright owner to produce, and
thus willing to enter a transaction that was mutually beneficial from
their and the copyright owner's points of view. The non-occurrence
of such transactions is a deadweight loss. 14 1 Price discrimination
reduces this loss: if the copyright owner is able to vary price in
response to individuals' differing willingness to pay for the product,
fewer individuals are priced out of the market. Not only do the copyright owner's profits increase, but so too does access to copyrighted
works. 1 42 The result is a double victory for social welfare, at least on
the common assumptions that increased copyright owner profits
incentivize further production of copyrighted works14 3 and that the
benefits that individual users enjoy in accessing copyrighted works
extend to the culture and polity as a whole.' 4 4 But price discrimination does not work if there is arbitrage-that is, if those who pay lower
prices resell the product to those who would be willing to pay higher
prices-which the first sale doctrine of course ordinarily permits.14 5 If
right-holders are allowed to limit first sale rights, however, they can
secure greater profits for themselves as well as increase access to their
works.
This stylized discussion of externalities seems to indicate that it
would be good policy to make certain categories of commandeering
off-limits. Fair use rights, for example, should be declared inalienable
because fair use restrictions weaken public discourse and thus have
negative consequences beyond the private transactions in which they
occur. Several scholars have thus argued that licenses that restrict fair
use should be unenforceable under the doctrine of copyright mis141 Id. at 1236.
142 Fisher observes that it is impossible to tell whether price discrimination
increases total consumer surplus, for the increase in consumer surplus enjoyed by
those who now buy the product is somewhat offset by a decrease in consumer surplus
enjoyed by those with greater willingness to pay who now pay more. Id. at 1239 &
n.85. He also notes that this uncertain result is nevertheless attractive from the perspective of distributive justice. Id. at 1239.
143 See, e.g., Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975)
("The immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an 'author's'
creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity
for the general public good."). But cf Glynn S. Lunney,Jr., Copynight'sPiceDiscnmination Panacea, 21 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 387 (2008) (questioning this rationale for price
discrimination).
144 See Elkin-Koren, supra note 135, at 1198.
145 See Fisher, supra note 140, at 1237.
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use.14 6 Meanwhile, the externalities rationale for inalienability might
not extend to other copyright entitlements such as first sale privileges,
which can yield socially beneficial price discrimination. Unfortunately, matters are not so simple, and these categorical conclusions
are undermined by serious uncertainties.
On the economic approach to commandeering, the net effect on
social welfare is what ultimately matters. Commandeering may
impose a pro tanto negative externality,1 4 7 but it is possible for the
social cost that this externality represents to be outweighed by the
social benefits of positive externalities. Any given species of commandeering may involve offsetting positive and negative externalities.
Consider again large-scale restrictions on fair use. These restrictions may indeed chill the creation of socially beneficial transformations, as explained above. This chilling effect seems to decrease the
public's access to expressive works and therefore to be a net drain on
social welfare. Yet it is not obvious that fair uses of copyrighted works
inevitably lead to an overall increase of access to those works, their
relatives, or acceptable substitutes. Take, for instance, possible fair
uses of digital platforms. Video game console manufacturers often
charge relatively low prices for their platforms and attempt to make
their profits mainly on individual games.14 8 If reverse engineers create interoperable games in reliance on the fair use doctrine, they compete with the platform manufacturers' own games and limit their
profitability. How can we know whether, given this competition, platform prices will remain low? It is actually quite difficult in the absence
of highly sophisticated models, since platform makers' overall reve146 E.g., Tom W. Bell, Codifying Copyright's Misuse Defense, 2007 UTAH L. REv. 573,
575; Loren, supra note 20, at 523-24. Courts, however, have resisted broad application of misuse doctrine and instead reserved it for licenses that impose anticompetitive restrictions. See, e.g., Practice Mgmt. Info. Corp. v. Am. Med. Ass'n, 121 F.3d 516,
521 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding misuse in license conditioned on promise not to use
competitors' products); Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 972-73, 979
(4th Cir. 1990) (finding misuse in license prohibiting production of products that
would compete with licensor's). But cf Assessment Techs. of WI, LLC v. WIREdata,
Inc., 350 F.3d 640, 647 (7th Cir. 2003) (suggesting in dicta that misuse defense might
extend to abusive attempts to secure copyright protection over uncopyrightable facts
but deciding case on other grounds); Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home
Entm't, Inc., 342 F.3d 191, 205-06 (3d Cir. 2003) (acknowledging possibility of misuse defense even without anticompetitive restrictions but not finding misuse in plaintiffs license agreement).
147 My use of "pro tanto" here is meant to mirror moral philosophers' use in
describing certain kinds of reasons for action. See, e.g., SHELLY KAGAN, THE LIMITS OF
MORALITY 17 (1989) (contrasting pro tanto and primafacie reasons).
148 See Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and Economics of Reverse
Engineering,111 YALE L.J. 1575, 1618-19 (2002).
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nues are partly influenced by network effects that are in turn dependent on the overall popularity of what the platform offers consumers
in conjunction with the available applications and peripherals. 1 4 9 In
the final analysis, it may well be the case that reverse-engineered
games increase overall access to video gameplay. But that result is not
guaranteed as a logical matter. It is conceivable that the opposite
result would obtain: less competition over games might keep console
prices low. If reverse engineering does increase console prices, and if
access to consoles generally yields positive externalities, social welfare
might be better served by allowing console manufacturers to restrict
fair use privileges.
Printers furnish another relevant example. Printer manufacturers frequently attempt to recoup some of their fixed costs of production through pricing ink or toner cartridges further above marginal
cost while pricing the printers themselves roughly at marginal cost.15 0
Given competition over systems, this tying can benefit consumers,
especially those who anticipate printing at low volumes, because printers will have lower prices and therefore be available to a larger number of individuals. 15 ' This form of price discrimination is only
practicable so long as system manufacturers can prevent competition
from reverse-engineered replacement cartridges through contractual
restrictions or other means.' 5 2 Here too, it is at least possible that the
increased competition over components, which results from fair use,
could correspond to higher initial investments for consumers. Higher
initial investments might result in less overall access to copyrighted
goods, which as above would likely be undesirable from society's point
of view.
These possibilities all involve a significant speculation because it
is very difficult to tell how offsetting externalities will compare in the
final analysis. Not only is it hard to predict the extent to which
increased access will occur if fair use restrictions are categorically
149 See id. at 1615-20.
150 E.g., David Becker, Lexmark Wins Injunction in DMCA Case, CNET NEWS (Feb.
27, 2003, 5:04 PM), http://news.cnet.com/2100-1028-990501.html.
151 See Randall C. Picker, Copyright and the DMCA: Market Locks and Technological
Contracts, in ANTITRUST, PATENTS, AND COPYRIGHT 180, 189 (Francois Lv4que & Howard Shelanski eds., 2005).
152 In addition to regular infringement claims-against which reverse-engineering
fair use defenses would be available, at least in the absence of commandeeringprinter manufacturers often use technological measures to stave off cartridge competition and then assert DMCA anti-circumvention claims. See, e.g., Lexmark Int'l, Inc.
v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522 (6th Cir. 2004) (vacating preliminary injunction because printer manufacturer could not establish likelihood of success on infringement and DMCA claims against cartridge competitor).
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allowed and the extent to which there will be greater innovation if fair
use restrictions are categorically prohibited; it is perhaps even harder
to commensurate these access and innovation externalities for a net
comparison. Which maximizes social welfare: increased access to
existing works but decreased opportunities to transform them into
new works through fair use, or increased opportunities to transform
existing works but decreased access to them? Economic analysis alone
may not be up to this task, and certainly is not at the present moment.
For now, then, these uncertainties counsel against rushing to any policy decision over fair use-commandeering on the basis of externalities
reasoning alone.
The net social desirability of first sale restrictions is hardly easier
to calculate. It is true (other things equal) that perfect price discrimination, which occurs when sellers charge each individual consumer
the highest price that that consumer is willing to pay, clearly promotes
social welfare more than uniform pricing because it ensures that all
mutually beneficial trades occur. But this idealized result does not
happen in the real world, where consumers do not wear their preferences on their sleeves and where arbitrage is difficult to prevent.
Imperfect price discrimination, which is what actually occurs, benefits
sellers but does not necessarily increase social welfare. In certain circumstances, it may actually lower social welfare.1 53 Beyond the general difficulty in analyzing the net effect of imperfect price
discrimination, there are again special access/innovation trade-offs in
the copyright context. Here, too, access to preexisting works may
spur the creation of new works. Copyright owners, however, may reasonably worry that creation of those new works will oppose their own
interests. Given the opportunity-for instance through first
sale-commandeering-copyright owners may be happy to limit certain users' access with the goal of thwarting future competition or criticism.15 4 Since copyright owners' information is limited, of course,
there is no guarantee that they would be able to accomplish such
goals. And so price discrimination could ultimately prove to increase
overall access among the users most likely to engage in value-creating
innovation.15 5 But the important point is that it is actually very chal153 See N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMIcs 317 (6th ed. 2011).
154 See, e.g., James Boyle, Cruel, Mean, or Lavish? Economic Analysis, PriceDiscrimination and Digital Intellectual Property, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2007, 2031-32 (2000). Fisher
notes this risk and recommends countering it through privileging socially beneficial
uses through expansions in fair use doctrine. See Fisher, supranote 140, at 1239 n.86,
1250-52.
155 See Michael J. Meurer, Copyright Law and Price Discrimination, 23 CARDozo L.
REv. 55, 94 (2001) ("Of course, it is also possible that low valuation buyers create
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lenging to determine whether the price discrimination that could
occur if first sale privileges were deemed alienable is not unambiguously a net positive for society.15 6
In sum, commandeering's overall social costs are hard to determine because there are multiple moving parts. Beside the challenges
inherent in measuring individual externalities, each individual externality needs to be compared to whatever others offset it. Commandeering's third-party harms may be countered by third-party benefits
because commandeering is likely to affect both access to existing
works and the likelihood of follow-on innovation, each of which contributes to social welfare.15 7 Even if we could accurately appraise each
of these effects individually, it would be very difficult to find a common measure along which to compare them. Despite the ubiquity of
copyright's balance metaphor, its goals of access and innovation are
not commensurable in any straightforward way. This incommensurability poses a significant problem for ex ante policymaking. At the very
least, the lack of greater empirical understanding and more finely
tuned economic models strongly suggests that definitive judgments
about the externalities generated by different categories of commanpositive externalities; examples might include research, religious, educational, or
political uses."); cf Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Distributive Values in Copyright, 83
TEX. L. REv. 1535, 1570 (2005) ("[P]oorly financed creators['] ... willingness to pay
is low, but they have the tools and the desire to communicate by creatively reusing
and redistributing copyrighted works, not merely by consuming those works
themselves.").
156 See, e.g., Meurer, supra note 155, at 107-08 (proposing that price discrimination may be socially beneficial on net for some works but not others and noting the
importance of empirical investigation).
157 As with the rest of this section, these claims are limited to offensive commandeering. By comparison, the third-party effects of defensive commandeering generally seem positive, since it involves the giving up of exclusive rights rather than their
expansion. See Van Houweling, supra note 18, at 948-49. There may be reasons to
oppose some forms of defensive commandeering, see infra Part III.A, but externalities
concerns are infrequently among them.
In theory, however, defensive commandeering can generate negative externalities, at least when the commandeering's purpose is to make copyrighted expression
unavailable. Alongside the usual medical office paperwork, some physicians evidently
require all their patients to sign away copyrights in any online reviews that the
patients write about their treatment experience. See generally The Back Story,
DocrORED REVIEWS, http://doctoredreviews.com/patients/the-back-story/ (last visitedJan. 11, 2012) (describing the story behind anti-review contracts). If such doctors
issue take-down notices in a way that eliminates accurate criticism, their defensive
commandeering would impose a social cost. Of course, if they remove a much larger
amount of inaccurate and misleading criticism, their commandeering might not be
socially costly on net.
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deering must rest at least partly on guesswork and personal
preferences.1 5 8
III.

A

PROPERTY-BASED APPROACH TO COMMANDEERING

The previous Part examined three common arguments against
types of copyright commandeering. I argued that they overreached
and did not deliver compelling reasons for courts to forbid entire categories of commandeering. In response, one could, of course, gravitate toward the opposite end of the policy spectrum and permit all
copyright commandeering, at least provided that it comported with
antitrust, contract, and other relevant law. But this also would be a
mistake, for commandeering is genuinely troubling in some circumstances. In this Part, I propose that commandeering should be scrutinized through the lens of in rem property rights, and I discuss how this
perspective applies to the facts of particular cases. I propose a definition of copyright commandeering in the strict sense, which covers the
subset of the practices this Article has been considering that should be
viewed by courts with heightened suspicion. Commandeering in the
strict sense consists in those large-scale adjustments to copyright entitlements that reach the level of changes in property rights and that
are effected without clear consent from those adversely affected.
Some, but not all, of the examples discussed earlier qualify as commandeering in this narrower sense.
Before proceeding, however, I should acknowledge the considerable debate that surrounds the concept of property, on which my proposal would seem crucially to depend. Philosophers and legal
theorists disagree strongly over how to think about property rights
and, in particular, about whether ownership of private property
amounts to nothing more than having a bundle of rights or instead is
a special kind of right to a thing where the thing's features play a role
in explaining what rights one has. Philosophers invoking Wesley
Hohfeld,159 as well as legal realistso6 0 and economists' 6 ' have often
158 Cf Harvey S. Perlman, Taking the Protection-Access Tradeoff Seriously, 53 VAND. L.
REv. 1831, 1839 (2000) ("[T]here is neither an economic theory nor sufficient empirical data to help in achieving a proper balance between [access and protection]. In
such circumstances, academic research that suggests a tweaking of either property or
access rights in either direction is unsatisfying because there is no way to tell whether
a particular move is likely to result in a net increase or decrease in innovation.").
159 E.g., STEPHEN R. MUNZER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY 23 (1990); see also WESLEY
NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS As APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REA-

72, 78 (Walter Wheeler Cook ed., 1919) (defining in rem rights in terms of the
numerosity and indefiniteness of the duty-holders instead of in terms of things). As
Munzer notes, Hohfeld did not himself advance a "bundle of rights" picture of propSONINc
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emphasized the former, but each group has had its opponents who
emphasize the central importance of things in the analysis of property
rights.16 2 Thankfully, I can set aside much of this controversy because
this Article is concerned with the normative implications of how certain rights function, not with conceptual analysis for its own sake. For
my purposes it is enough to identify a few. special functions that property rights have but that the legal mechanisms used in commandeering, such as contracts and class action settlements, usually do not
have. The next three sections, therefore, center on the temporal
extendedness of property rights, the remedies typically associated with
property rights violations, and the ability of property rights to impose
obligations on third parties. Recognition of these three qualities of
property does not require taking a firm stand on foundational conceptual controversies.
A.

Google's Attempted Property Taking

The impact of commandeering on property rights as such is at
the heart of the reasoning of the district court that rejected the proposed Google Books settlement. Recall that Google had endeavored
to create an elaborate arrangement with prospective effect, including,
most importantly, granting Google and its customers permission to
engage in behavior that, but for the settlement, would have qualified
as copyright infringement.16 3 Like any other proposed class action
settlement, the Google Books settlement would become effective only
upon the court's determination that the settlement was "fair, reasonable, and adequate."1 64 Courts consider a wide array of factors in this
process,' 6 5 but the overarching inquiry involves weighing "the plaintiff's likelihood of success on the merits against the amount and form
erty but rather created an analytic vocabulary of rights and correlative duties that is
well-suited for such a picture of property. See MUNZER, supra, at 17-18.
160 E.g., Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in Nomos XXII 69 (J.
Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980).
161 E.g., R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3J.L. & ECON. 1, 44 (1960) (describing land ownership as consisting in "the right to carry out a circumscribed list of
actions").
162 See, e.g., Hanoch Dagan, The Craft of Property, 91 CALIF. L. REv. 1517 (2003);
Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Wat Happened to Property in Law and Economics?,
111 YALE L.J. 357 (2001); J.E. Penner, The "Bundle of Rights" Picture of Property, 43
UCLA L. REv. 711 (1996).
163 See supra text accompanying notes 42-50.
164 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e) (2).
165 See, e.g., City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 463 (2d Cir. 1974)
(identifying nine factors for courts to consider), abrogated on other grounds by Goldberger v. Integrated Res., Inc., 209 F.3d 43 (2d Cir. 2000).
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of the relief offered in the settlement."' 6 6 There is no serious doubt
about whether Google's unauthorized sale of complete copyrighted
texts, even on the condition that it share revenues with owners of the
texts' copyrights, would amount to actionable infringement. Indeed
Google never claimed otherwise. 6 7 Yet the proposed settlement
would have allowed Google to do just that, unless the right-holder
affirmatively opted out of Google's project in accordance with the settlement's terms.16 8 In rejecting the Google Books settlement, the district court rightly concluded that the settlement attempted to
accomplish too much, given what it was proposing that class members
relinquish.
In determining that the settlement would go too far, the district
court expressed concern not over the part of the settlement that
released Google for already-incurred liability, but over the part that
would excuse Google's yet-to-be-committed infringement.' 69 The
court found this part of the settlement to be a misuse of the class
action mechanism because it attempted to go well beyond the plaintiffs' actual claims by establishing a forward-looking business arrangement.170 In particular, the court observed that copyright owners
would lose property rights unless they seized the initiative required to
opt out of the settlement: "[C]lass members would be giving up certain property rights in their creative works, and they would be
deemed-by their silence-to have granted to Google a license to
future use of their copyrighted works."' 7 ' This feature of the settle166 Carson v. Am. Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 88 n.14 (1981).
167 See Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666, 678 n.I1 (S.D.N.Y.
2011).
168 Right-holders initially had the ability to opt out of the settlement class entirely,
but this ability expired on January 28, 2010. Order Granting Preliminary Approval of
Amended Settlement Agreement at 5, Authors Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d 666 (No. 05 CV
8136-DC), available at http://thepublicindex.org/docs/amendedsettlement/order
granting-prelimapproval.pdf. Those who remained class members had options
under the settlement to have their works removed from Google's database, but those
options too had expiration dates. See Amended Settlement Agreement, supra note 47,
at § 3.5(a). Short of complete removal, right-holders who felt that Google was infringing their works would have been able to request limits on Google's display of their
works to its customers. Id. §§ 3.2(e) (i), 3.5(b) (i). But right-holders' ability to
demand specific display arrangements with Google was nevertheless limited in various
ways including, notably, the "coupling requirement" that the right-holder for an outof-print book allow the book to be accessed via institutional subscriptions if she
wanted the book to be available for individual consumer purchase. Id. § 3.5(b) (iii).
169 See Authors Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 669, 676-77.
170 See id. at 678-79.
171 Id. at 680.
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ment, the court determined, essentially amounted to expropriation of
copyright owners' property. 172
Although the court did not explain its conception of property
rights in detail, the forward-looking effect of the settlement was clearly
at the fore of the court's thinking. Interferences with ownership can
be of either limited or indefinite duration. These interferences have
traditionally been treated differently in the law because they are
rather different types of injury. That difference explains, for instance,
why it is (at most) a trespass for state actors to invade private property
on a single occasion,17 3 yet it is a taking for state actors to authorize a
permanent invasion of private property. 7 4 To interfere with an
owner's use of her property on a particular occasion is injurious, but it
is a far greater injury to interfere with use of that property forever.' 75
This insight also accounts for the common law distinction between
trespass to chattels and conversion, as well as for the differing remedies available for each cause of action. William Prosser explains:
The theory of trespass was that the plaintiff remained the owner of
the chattel, with his possession only interfered with or interrupted,
so that when it was tendered back to him he must accept it. His
recovery was limited to the damages he had sustained through his
loss of possession, or through harm to the chattel, which were usually considerably less than its value. The theory of trover was that
the defendant, by "converting" the chattel to his own use, had
appropriated the plaintiff's rights, for which he was required to
make compensation. The plaintiff was therefore not required to
accept the chattel when it was tendered back to him; and he recovered as his damages the full value of the chattel . . . ."7
Trespass to chattels, in other words, involves temporally limited
interference with ownership, while conversion injures the owner's
rights in the chattel permanently. Because of the potential durability
of property violations-that is, the fact that they can extend indefinitely through time-the law has long acted differently in the case of
property intrusions that are over and done with than in the case of
those that are continuing with no end in sight. In both cases, courts
will award compensation for harms resulting from the violation, but in
172 See id. at 680-81.
173 See, e.g., Turner v. Sheriff of Marion Cnty., 94 F. Supp. 2d 966, 984 (S.D. Ind.
2000).
174 See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 441
(1982).
175 See id. at 435.
176 William L. Prosser, The Nature of Conversion, 42 CORNELL L.Q. 168, 170 (1957).
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the latter, courts are further likely to issue injunctions ordering the
violation to end.17 7
In rejecting the Google Books settlement, the district court continued this tradition of distinguishing between temporary and permanent property violations. The proposed settlement would not merely
have released Google from liability for previous, temporally limited
incursions into the class members' intellectual property rights. It
would have amounted to a permanent impairment of the remaining
life of their copyrights by indefinitely authorizing Google and its customers to reproduce class members' copyrighted works without needing to secure permission. In this respect, the Google Books
settlement operated no differently than the other forms of defensive
commandeering discussed in Part I. ASCAP, Lucasfilm, and Creative
Commons each demanded the permanent relinquishment of copyright interests. 178 A crucial difference between the Google Books settlement and those examples, however, was in the former's automatic
inclusion of innumerable copyright owners.179 This opt-out design
was in tension with the usual presumptions of property rights, which
prohibit use of private property even if its owner has not explicitly
denied his permission to users seeking access to his property. The
default in property law is no use without permission.1 s0 The court
noted that this feature of the Google Books settlement was of particular concern in the copyright context. Not only does copyright law,
like the law of tangible property, place permission-related burdens on
those seeking access rather than on copyright owners, but furthermore copyright owners affected by Google's project might not know
177 Courts do not necessarily grant injunctive relief, however, where the injunction
would result in disproportionate hardship. See, e.g., City of Harrisonville v. W.S.
Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., 289 U.S. 334, 337-38 (1933); cf eBay Inc. v. MercExchange,
LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006) (requiring courts to consider "the balance of hardships" before issuing an injunction against patent infringement). In deciding
whether to issue injunctions, however, courts are largely unmoved by claims of disproportionate hardship if the defendant intentionally violated the plaintiffs property
rights. See, e.g., Ottavia v. Savarese, 155 N.E.2d 432, 436 (Mass. 1959).
178 See supra notes 58-64, 73-78 and accompanying text.
179 Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666, 681 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (judging settlement's opt-out nature to be incompatible with property's right to exclude).
180 Felix Cohen famously characterized property as bearing the following label:
To the world:
Keep off X unless you have my permission, which I may grant or withhold.
Signed: Private citizen
Endorsed: The state
Felix S. Cohen, Dialogue on PrivateProperty, 9 RUTGERS L. REv. 357, 374 (1954).
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who they are. 8 1 In the other examples of defensive commandeering,
individual owners affirmatively consented to the transfer of their property interests. Although the terms of this transfer were not fully within
these copyright owners' control, there is still reason to think that they
found agreeing to those terms preferable to refusing them. For this
reason, courts may accept that their assent, unlike that of the Google
Books class members, 8 2 was voluntarily given. In sum, of these various examples, the Google Books settlement is the clearest example of
copyright commandeering, because it both rearranges property rights
and does so without adequate consent.
Consent, of a certain kind, is also the factor that distinguishes the
Google Books settlement from that proposed in another highly prominent copyright class action, In re Literary Works in Electronic Databases
Copyright Litigation.'8 3 Freelance writers had brought infringement
claims against a group of publishers and electronic database creators
for unauthorized reproduction of the writers' works.18 4 In 2005, representatives of the parties negotiated a class action settlement, which a
district court approved, but in 2007, the Second Circuit held that federal courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction to approve the settlement as written.1 85 The Supreme Court then reversed the Second
Circuit's subject matter jurisdiction holding. 186 And in the most
recent episode of this controversy, the Second Circuit rejected the set181 See Authors Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 682. There are well-known difficulties
involved, for instance, in identifying the ownership of copyright interests in derivative
works, especially given the frequency with which such interests are transferred, to the
extent that sometimes copyright owners themselves "are simply unaware of what they
own." U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT ON ORPHAN WoRmS 27 (2006). Aside from
difficulties involved in appreciating one's ownership of orphan works copyrights, the
Authors Guild court noted that "there are likely to be many authors-including those
whose works will not be scanned by Google until some years in the future-who will
simply not know to come forward." Authors Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 682.
182 The court concluded by indicating that an opt-in version of the settlement
would allay most of its concerns. Authors Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 686.
183 654 F.3d 242 (2d Cir. 2011) (Literary Works II).
184 Before the litigation turned into a class action, defendants' main defense
against the infringement claims was appealing to 17 U.S.C. § 201 (c) (2006), which
speaks of collective work copyright owners' privilege to reproduce an individually
copyrighted contribution, inter alia, in revisions of the collective work. The Supreme
Court eventually held, however, that this statutory provision did not apply to reproducing the contribution in electronic databases because those databases distribute
individual articles apart from the context of the collective work that originally contained them. N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 488 (2001).
185 In re Literary Works in Elec. Databases Copyright Litig., 509 F.3d 116, 118 (2d
Cir. 2007) (Literary Works 1).
186 Reed-Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 130 S. Ct. 1237 (2010).
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tlement because of conflicts within the class. 18 7 But most importantly
for present purposes, the Second Circuit simultaneously rejected
objectors' argument that the proposed settlement was improper
because it attempted to release claims against defendants and their
licensees for future infringement that had not yet occurred.18 8
Although the court's opinion made no mention of the Google Books
case,1 89 its brisk treatment of the objectors' argument is in some tension with the Google court's skepticism of forward-looking business
arrangements.1 9 0 Yet while the two courts' levels of concern about
property rights as such are indeed dissimilar, there is a significant difference in the degree of consent that class members had shown with
respect to the alleged infringement in the two cases. Unlike the
Google Books class, which included many copyright owners-such as
orphan work copyright owners-who had never interacted with the
alleged infringer, the Literary Works class members had already consented to publisher-defendants' reproduction and distribution of
their works. 1 9 ' It is true that the authors had not specifically consented to reproduction and distribution through digital media, 19 2 but
it is hard to imagine why writers who had agreed to permit printed
distribution of their writings would oppose digital distribution except
in an effort to secure higher compensation.19 3 Because class members
had thus previously shown a willingness to authorize these defendants'
use of their works, a court could reasonably view this litigation as
being more about how to divide a new revenue stream in an existing
business arrangement than about a complaint by unconsenting right187 Literary Works II, 654 F.3d at 254.
188 Id. at 247-48.
189 The circuit court did explicitly note, however, that it was refusing to consider,
for reasons of untimeliness, arguments based on Local No. 93, InternationalAss'n of
Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501 (1986), on which the Authors Guild court
expressly relied. Literary Works II, 654 F.3d at 248 n.4; see also Authors Guild v. Google,
Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666, 679 & n.15 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (applying Firefighters).
190 Literary Works II, 654 F.3d at 248 ("[R]egardless of whether future infringements would be considered independent injuries, the Settlement's release of claims
regarding future infringements is not improper." (citing Uhl v. Thoroughbred Tech.
& Telecomms., Inc., 309 F.3d 978, 982, 984-85 (7th Cir. 2002))).
191 See, e.g., id. at 245.
192 See N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 489 (2001).
193 Cf id. at 510 n.6 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Even on my view of this case,
respondents retain substantial rights over their articles. Only the respondents, for
example, could authorize the publication of their articles in different periodicals or
in new topical anthologies wholly apart from the context of the original collective
works in which their articles appeared.").
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holders that their copyright interests were being permanently
impaired.
Despite the unique facts surrounding the Google Books settlement, the court's justification for rejecting the settlement generalizes.
Attempts to cause dramatic changes in the operation of the copyright
system give pause for good reason. One need not invoke a perceived
"delicate balance" 1 9 4 to be troubled by Google's ambitious attempt to
change the way that copyright law operates. Its approach to orphan
works seems particularly impertinent given Congress's continuing
struggles to reach a widely acceptable solution.19 5 The Google litigation also challenges easygoing acceptance of private reordering when
that reordering occurs without the consent of those affected. Absent
such consent, there is no justification for the presumption that the
transfer was fair to the transferors. Although one can make a good
argument that the Google Books settlement attempted to be fair to
the affected parties, it is remarkable how strongly certain of those parties thought otherwise.1 9 6 Change to property rights as such, when
effected by means of paltry consent, thus suggests itself as a reasonable
place for courts to draw the line between acceptable and unacceptable
modifications of copyright's defaults.
B.

Securing Property Remedies Through License Genymandering

The stricter definition of commandeering also helps to reach a
verdict about a common offensive commandeering practice, namely
using mass licenses in order to secure more favorable remedies.
Another respect in which property rights are distinctive is in their connection to those remedies known, appropriately enough, as "property
rules." The concept of property rules was made famous by Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed, who contrasted them with "liability
rules" as a means by which the law might protect entitlements: When
property rules protect an entitlement, anyone seeking to acquire it
must do so through negotiation and voluntary exchange with its
holder. When liability rules protect the entitlement, by contrast, anyone may acquire it from the holder simply by paying its fair value as
determined by the state. 19 7 Injunctions and punitive damages are the
194 See supra Part II.A.
195 See Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666, 678 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
196 See, e.g., id. at 682 n.18 ("The situation we find ourselves in now is one of
dismay and powerlessness, with only the weak ability to 'object' or opt out." (quoting
letter from two literary agents)).
197 See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 96, at 1092.
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paradigmatic examples of property rule remedies because they pressure acquirers to obtain permission from the entitlement holder.1 98
In copyright law, property rules predominate.19 9 Those whose
works are infringed may elect to receive statutory damages instead of
actual damages. 20 0 Statutory damages range from $750 to $30,000 per
work, 201 and if the right-holder shows the infringement was willful, the
court has discretion to increase the per work amount up to
$150,000.202 In many circumstances, these damages are super-compensatory-that is, they greatly exceed the measurable harm that the
right-holder suffered on account of the defendant's actions. 203
Indeed, copyright damages sometimes reach such astronomic heights
that two trial courts have recently held that they violate substantive
due process. 204 In addition to statutory remedies, courts may also
award attorneys' fees and costs, 2 05 which can also be considerable.2 0 6
And finally, the Copyright Act specifies that courts, as they see fit, may
award injunctions to restrain infringement going forward. 207 These
remedial possibilities all serve to benefit copyright owners by assuring
them a more robust form of protection for their intellectual property
entitlements.
198 See, e.g., id. at 1126-27 & n. 7 1.
199 A copyright owner is eligible for certain property rule remedies, however, only
if the work is registered with the U.S. Copyright Office. See 17 U.S.C. § 412 (2006).
200 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (1).
201 Id. The court has the discretion to reduce the statutory damages to $200 if the
infringer shows that she had no reason to believe her behavior constituted infringement. Id. § 504(c) (2).
202 Id. § 504(c) (2).
203 See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson & Tara Wheatland, Statutory Damages in Copyright
Law: A Remedy in Need of Reform, 51 WM. & MARY L. REv. 439, 461-62 (2009).
204 See Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, 100 U.S.P.Q 2d 1183 (D. Minn.
2011); Sony BMG Music Entm't v. Tenenbaum, 721 F. Supp. 2d 85, 116 (D. Mass.
2010). One of those courts, however, has already been reversed. See Sony BMG Music
Entm't v. Tenenbaum, 660 F.3d 487 (1st Cir. 2011).
205 17 U.S.C. § 505.
206 Courts may award attorneys' fees and costs to whichever side wins in copyright
litigation, including victorious defendants. In one extreme recent case, the court
forced a losing plaintiff to pay a mind-boggling $137 million in costs to the defendant
it had accused of infringement. Mattel, Inc. v. MGA Entm't, Inc., No. CV 04-9049
DOC, slip op. at 16 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2011). The decision has been appealed. See
Joel Rosenblatt, Mattel Files to Appeal Judge's Award to MGA Entertainment in Bratz Case,
BLOOMBERG (Aug. 11, 2011), available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-0812/mattel-files-to-appealjudge-s-award-to-mga-entertainment-in-bratz-case.html.
207 17 U.S.C. § 502(a). But cf eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388
(2006) (identifying four factors that courts must consider before granting injunctions
in patent cases).
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Contractual entitlements, by contrast, are generally protected
only by liability rules: The typical remedy for contract breach is some
measure of actual damages, whereas injunctive relief, specific performance, is not available as a matter of course. 208 It is no wonder,
then, that copyright owners who acquire new entitlements by license
agreements have attempted to draft their licenses so as to protect
those newly acquired entitlements with copyright remedies rather
than contract remedies. I call this practice license gerrymandering
because it requires manipulating contractual language so that certain
actions that do not typically fall within the category of copyright
infringement nevertheless do so when committed by the licensee.
Thus, rather than have violation of the agreement's terms be treated
as breach of contract, gerrymanderers draft their terms so that the
violation will be treated as a violation of the underlying copyright.
The way they do this is by granting licensees conditionalpermission to
engage in acts that would themselves be infringing if committed without authorization-that is, licensors grant access to their copyrighted
works only on the condition that licensees not engage in certain specified behavior that is either expressly permitted by copyright law as
non-infringing or completely unrelated to what counts as infringement. Consider a few examples that courts have confronted.
First,software manufacturers have attempted to limit competition
through licenses that undo the presumption that reverse engineering
for interoperability is fair use. In Bowers v. Baystate Technologies, Inc.,
the Federal Circuit considered a shrinkwrap license provision that
prohibited reverse engineering of the licensed software product. 209
Although it noted that reverse engineering of software was typically
considered fair use, 2 10 the panel held that the Copyright Act does not
preempt breach of contract claims waiving fair use rights. 2 11 Dissenting in relevant part, Judge Dyk disagreed in the court's preemption
holding as it concerned shrinkwrap licenses, but nevertheless agreed
"that a state can permit parties to contract away a fair use defense or
to agree not to engage in uses of copyrighted material that are permitted by the copyright law, if the contract is freely negotiated."21 2 Neither
the majority nor the dissent, however, reached the question of
208 See, e.g., Anthony T. Kronman, Specific Perfomance,45 U. CHI. L. REv. 351, 354
(1978).
209 Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
210 See id. at 1325 (citing Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d
832, 843 (Fed. Cir. 1992)).
211 Id. at 1323-28.
212 Id. at 1336 (Dyk, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis
added).
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whether such contracting could create new infringement liability over
and above actions for contract breach. The copyright owner had
brought infringement claims on account of the reverse engineering,2 1 3 and in fact the jury had awarded infringement damages in
addition to contract breach damages.2 14 But the trial court had set
aside the copyright damages awarded by the jury (which were actually
lower than the contract damages) as duplicative of the contract damages, and the appellate court affirmed.2 15
Second, open-source licensors have sought to preserve the openness of their projects by conditioning certain uses of their works on
the licensee's open-source reciprocation. In Jacobsen v. Katzer, a copyright owner argued that defendants had made unauthorized copies
and modifications of his computer program, which, though copyrighted, was available under the open-source Artistic License. 216 In
considering the plaintiffs infringement claims, the Federal Circuit
explored the distinction between contractual covenants and conditions.21 7 Jacobsen, relying on the Artistic License's "provided that"
language, argued that it granted conditional privileges to use and
modify the software only to licensees who did not present the licensed
material as their own work. 218 The district court was willing to agree
that Katzer's violation of the license terms constituted breach of the
license, but was unwilling to hold that the license's terms "create [d]
liability for copyright infringement where it would not otherwise
exist."2 19 The court of appeals was more receptive to Jacobsen's argument, focusing on the license language and the licensor's presumed
objectives. Both considerations pointed in favor of construing the
license terms as conditions specifying the scope of the permission
granted rather than as mere covenants. First, the court pointed out
that the license's explicit stated intent was "to state the conditions
under which a Package may be copied," and further the court noted
that applicable state contract law typically views the phrase "provided
that" as indicative of a condition. 220 Second, the court observed that
213 See id. at 1327-28 (majority opinion).
214 Id. at 1322.
215 Id. at 1328.
216 Jacobsen v. Katzer, 535 F.3d 1373, 1375-76 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
217 Id. at 1380 ("The heart of the argument on appeal concerns whether the terms
of the Artistic License are conditions of, or merely covenants to, the copyright
license.").
218 SeeJacobsen v. Katzer, No. C 06-01905JSW, 2007 WL 2358628, at *6 (N.D. Cal.
Aug. 17, 2007).
219 Id. at *7.
220 Jacobsen, 535 F.3d at 1381 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Biepenbrok v. Luiz, 115 P. 743 (Cal. 1911)).
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given the goals of the open source movement and the uncertain adequacy of contract damages as relief, construing the contractual provisions as conditions was essential to protecting the copyright owner's
economic interests. 2 2 1 The court thus concluded that violation of the
terms of the Artistic License would constitute infringement.
Third, the creators of the online game, World of Warcraft, gerrymandered their end-user license agreement to ensure fair game-play
as they understood it. Their user agreements required licensees to
agree not to use third-party "bot" programs, which automatically work
through early levels of the game on the end-user's behalf.2 2 2 They
then argued, in MDY Industries, LLC v. Blizzard Entertainment,Inc., that
a bot maker was liable for secondary infringement, which necessitated
a finding that individual players' bot use constituted direct infringement. 22 3 The Ninth Circuit, however, held that bot use was not
infringing because the bot prohibitions constituted covenants, not
conditions. 224 After deciding upon this construction of the license,
the court proceeded to declare that, "for a licensee's violation of a
contract to constitute copyright infringement, there must be a nexus
between the condition and the licensor's exclusive rights of copyright."225 Bot use lacked a sufficient nexus, according to the court,
because it did not copy or modify the copyrighted software. 226
Courts have thus taken a variety of approaches to license gerrymandering. Which approach makes the most sense? Robert
Gomulkiewicz has articulated the two most prominent contenders: the
approach that gives licensors total leeway in drafting their terms as
conditions, and the approach that requires conditions to touch upon
the exclusive rights granted to authors under § 106 of the copyright
statute. 227 He opts for the former because of worries that the latter
might foreclose the possibility of innovative business models, including open source "share alike" or attribution requirements, enforcement of which seems likely to promote social welfare. 2 28
The Ninth Circuit, however, embraced the other approach in
MDY Industries by announcing its nexus requirement for gerrymandered licenses. The court's holding is somewhat ambiguous on
221
222
223
224
225
226
227

See id. at 1381-82.
See MDY Indus., LLCv. Blizzard Entm't, Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 938 (9th Cir. 2010).
Id. at 937.
Id. at 939-40.
Id. at 941.
Id.
See Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, Conditions and Covenants in License Contracts: Tales
from a Test of the Artistic License, 17 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 335, 354-58 (2009).
228 See id. at 355-56, 358-60.
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this score, since its discussion begins with a focus on the Terms of Use
language, much like the Jacobsen court's. 2 29 But its subsequent
announcement of the nexus requirement makes it hard to imagine
that the court would have enforced a "provided that" restriction as a
condition that made infringement remedies available. 230
Of these two approaches, Gomulkiewicz's is much more defensible as an analytic matter, especially given Ninth Circuit precedent,
which does seem to make it easy for software licensors to describe violations of license terms in a way that touches upon their exclusive
rights. 2 3 1 Applying that precedent, the MDYIndustries court itself held
that World of Warcraft players were licensees and not owners of the
software; they were thus unable to rely on the "essential step" defense
to infringement, which § 117 of the copyright statute makes available
to owners of computer programs. 232 Because running the program
creates a copy of the copyrighted code in the user's RAM, the copyright statute, according to Ninth Circuit precedent, prohibits World of
Warcraft users from running the program unless they have permission
from the right-holder.2 33 Without permission, such normal use of the
program qualifies as infringement. So suppose that, unlike this particular license agreement, World of Warcraft users were clearly granted
permission to run the program only on the condition that they not
employ bots. Then their use of bots would end their permission to
copy the software code into their RAM and violate the copyright
owner's exclusive right against "unlawful reproduction." It is not clear
how the license violation, in such circumstances, would lack a nexus
with the owner's exclusive right of reproduction.
Perhaps what the Ninth Circuit meant was that using a bot to play
a computer game does not in and of itself infringe copyright in the
way that making unauthorized derivative works does. It would, however, be quite radical to suggest that license restrictions prohibiting
actions that are not in and of themselves infringing could never act as
conditions. Not only would such a rule make attribution conditions
229 MDYIndus., 629 F.3d at 939 ("[I]f the contract is unambiguous, the court construes it according to its terms.").
230 See id. at 941 ("Were we to hold otherwise, Blizzard-or any software copyright
holder-could designate any disfavored conduct during software use as copyright
infringement, by purporting to condition the license on the player's abstention from
the disfavored conduct.").
231 See Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2010); Wall Data, Inc. v.
L.A. Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, 447 F.3d 769 (9th Cir. 2006); Triad Sys. Corp. v. Se. Express
Co., 64 F.3d 1330 (9th Cir. 1995); MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d
511 (9th Cir. 1993).
232 MDY Indus., 629 F.3d at 939 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 117(a) (1) (2006)).
233 Id.
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powerless, as Gomulkiewicz worried, but it would also foreclose the
common practice of conditioning copyright licenses on payment.
Failing to pay a copyright owner some sum of money does not in and
of itself violate her copyright. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit expressly recognized this issue in a footnote, and yet responded with an ad hoc
summary dismissal of its significance. 2 3 4 Payment of money is just one
form of consideration one might pay for a license. Agreeing to
refrain from certain behavior that the licensor finds objectionable is
another. Thus it would seem important to identify a principled basis
for distinguishing cash payments from these other forms of consideration. 2 35 Yet the court offered none.2 3 6
Gomulkiewicz's preferred approach is less vulnerable to charges
of inconsistency, but it is not without its dangers. The particular result
in Jacobsen was certainly welcome to those who value free access to
expressive works according to the terms of open source licensors. 237
But for that camp, the court's reasoning is a double-edged sword. The
court's reliance on such magic words as "condition" and "provided
that" points the way forward for future license gerrymanderers in
search of profit. If an open source licensor can choose contractual
language carefully in order to grant a conditional license, then any
minimally sophisticated licensor attempting to limit fair use or first
sale rights can do likewise. The Jacobsen court certainly did not identify any doctrinal principle that would confine this ability to open
source licensors. To the contrary, the court only exacerbated the dangers of the laissez-faireapproach by going against traditional contract
interpretation principles and focusing on Jacobsen's motives and economic interests to interpret the license agreement he selected. 238
234 Id. at 941 n.4 ("We view payment as sui generis, however, because of the distinct
nexus between payment and all commercial copyright licenses, not just those concerning software.").
235 Cf Jacobsen v. Katzer, 535 F.3d 1373, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ("Traditionally,
copyright owners sold their copyrighted material in exchange for money. The lack of
money changing hands in open source licensing should not be presumed to mean
that there is no economic consideration, however.").
236 Cf Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Touching and Concerning Copyright: Real Property Reasoning in MDY Industries, Inc. v. Blizzard Entertainment, Inc., 51 SANTA CLARA
L. REv. 1063, 1083-85 (2011) (criticizing the MDY Industriescourt's formulation of its
nexus requirement but defending a reformulation that appeals to the purposes of
copyright law).
237 See, e.g., Paul H. Arne, Jacobsen v. Katzer-Open Source License Validation: How
FarDoes It Go, COMPUTER & INTERNET LAw., Nov. 2008, at 27, 29 ("This case is a major
win for the open source movement.").
238 See, e.g., Jacobsen, 535 F.3d at 1382.
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This move startlingly suggests that ambiguous license language should
be interpreted according to the presumed intent of the drafter.2 39
Moreover, the Jacobsencourt's failure to draw a principled distinction between good and bad types of gerrymandering is troubling
because licensees do not always understand the legal ramifications of
the conditions/covenants distinction and the tiny variations in language that make the difference. 240 Indeed, there is evidence that the
creators of open source licenses did not even understand this technical point before Jacobsen.24 1 The district court in Jacobsen seems to
have missed it as well.2 42
These worries indicate that a preferable approach to license gerrymandering would be less deferential than the laissez-faire approach
and yet not fall into the conceptual inconsistencies that plague the
nexus approach. Commentators have largely overlooked the possibility of other approaches to commandeering.2 4 3 One possibility would
be to try to determine, ex ante, when permitting property rules in gerrymandered licenses contributes to social welfare. There is of course
an enormous literature about the extent to which property rules constitute an efficient way to protect legal entitlements. Proponents of
liability rules point to their ability to address hold-outs and facilitate
239 The court did not note the contract construction canon that ambiguous terms
are to be construed against the drafter, or more generally the canon that ambiguous
terms are to be construed as covenants instead of conditions. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS §§ 206, 227 (1981); see also MDY Indus., 629 F.3d at 939 ("Wherever
possible, equity construes ambiguous contract provisions as covenants rather than
conditions.").
240 CompareJacobsen, 535 F.3d at 1381 (interpreting license using "provided that"
as containing conditions), with Fantastic Fakes, Inc. v. Pickwick Int'l, 661 F.2d 479,
481, 484 (5th Cir. 1981) (interpreting license using "subject to and in accordance
with the following" as containing covenants).
241 See Lawrence Rosen, Bad Facts Make Good Law: The Jacobsen Case and Open
Source, 1 INT'L FREE & OPEN SOURCE SorrWARE L. REv. 27, 30 (2009) ("The people
who wrote the Artistic License, and those who wrote the GPL, and those who wrote
many other open source licenses, lucked out on the Jacobsen case. Many of us license
authors didn't know the legal difference between a 'covenant' and a 'condition' when
our licenses were written (and many attorneys still don't).").
242 See Jacobsen, 535 F.3d at 1380 & n.4.
243 Although Gomulkiewicz endorses some degree of remedy-stage skepticism of
license restrictions, he does not develop the argument to be made on their behalf.
See Gomulkiewicz, supra note 227, at 360. Instead, he mostly attempts to downplay
the risk that "[p]owerful or clever licensors, arguably, could characterize every conceivable provision as a license condition in order to enhance their opportunity for
copyright remedies" by indicating that sometimes licensees are themselves powerful
and clever. Id. at 356, 357-58.
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bargaining,24 4 while opponents argue that these advantages are exaggerated.2 4 5 One could attempt to apply insights from this scholarship
to license gerrymandering. I am not enthusiastic about the enterprise, however, because of the same access/innovation incommensurables that make it so hard to reach a definitive conclusion about
commandeering's externalities. 246 Instead of such an approach,
courts should openly begin subjecting gerrymandered licenses to ex
post scrutiny, for they would have an easier time spotting unfair or
socially harmful uses of gerrymandered licenses on a case-by-case
basis. 24 7
The relative costs and benefits of ex post legal decision-making
have been discussed at length in the legal literature on rules and standards. Giving content to legal norms ex ante is generally associated
with legal rules, and ex post content-giving with standards.2 48 In general, actors in the legal system tend to have an easier time structuring
their behavior around law that results from ex ante decision-making
because it creates law that is more easily known in advance. Legal
uncertainty that arises from vague standards can lead to inefficient2 4 9
and unfair 25 0 outcomes. On the other hand, vague legal standards
244 See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining:Dividing a Legal Entitlement to Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027, 1038-39 (1995); Calabresi &
Melamed, supra note 96, at 1106-10.
245 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, A Clear View of The Cathedral: The Dominance of
Property Rules, 106 YALE L.J. 2091, 2095-96 (1997); Henry E. Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1719, 1722-31 (2004).
246 See supra text accompanying notes 147-58.
247 To my knowledge, Professors Reichman and Franklin are the only other
authors to have developed a mostly ex post response to commandeering problems. See
J.H. Reichman & Jonathan A. Franklin, Privately Legislated Intellectual Property Rights:
Reconciling Freedom of Contract with Public Good Uses of Information, 147 U. PA. L. REV.
875, 931 (1999). My proposal's content, however, differs considerably from theirs,
which requires: "All mass-market contracts, non-negotiable access contracts, and contracts imposing non-negotiable restrictions on uses of computerized information
goods must be made on fair and reasonable terms and conditions, with due regard for
the public interest in education, science, research, technological innovation, freedom
of speech, and the preservation of competition." Id. at 930. This standard seems to
me to be too open-ended and vague in the guidance it offers courts and private
parties.
248 See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards:An Economic Analysis, 42 DuKE L.J.
557, 559-60 (1992).
249 See, e.g.,John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance with Legal Standards, 70 VA. L. REv. 965, 965 (1984) (describing how uncertainty
produces undercompliance and overcompliance with legal norms).
250 For a rather extreme articulation of this intuition, consider Justice Souter's
claim that "a penalty should be reasonably predictable in its severity, so that even
Justice Holmes's 'bad man' can look ahead with some ability to know what the stakes
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can enable courts to reach better and fairer results in individual cases.
Neither approach works well in all situations. This Article's claim is
that commandeering in general and license gerrymandering in particular present circumstances well-suited to ex post decision making.
Ex post decision making tends to be superior when the contents
of optimal laws are hard to identify ex ante. Since at least Aristotle,
legal theorists have understood that there are limits to the possibility
of promulgating generally applicable, predictable laws that constrain
arbiters' discretion while also leading to good results. In the Politics,
Aristotle acknowledges the desirability of promulgating such laws and
confines magistrates' discretion to matters "on which the laws are unable to speak with precision owing to the difficulty of any general principle embracing all particulars." 25 1 The law that aims to cover all
circumstances may fail, Aristotle tells us in the Nicomachean Ethics,
because "about some things it is not possible to make a universal statement which will be correct."252 In such cases, the legislation's oversimplicity can only be corrected ex post once a controversy has
arisen. 253 Louis Kaplow has echoed some of these observations more
recently, arguing that rules are more costly to promulgate than standards because "the ideal content of the law

. . .

is not immediately

apparent."2 54
Copyright commandeering rules are extremely difficult to formulate ex ante for the reasons articulated in Part II. Legislative intentions
provide little guidance; the actual extent of information costs, let
alone how they compare to any accompanying benefits, is difficult to
predict; and externalities are likewise very hard to measure a priori
because of offsetting costs and benefits. Many relevant determinations are easier to make ex post. Even the author of ProCD admits this

are in choosing one course of action or another." Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554
U.S. 471, 502 (2008) (citing Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARv.
L. REV. 457, 459 (1897)). But see Seana Valentine Shiffrin, InducingMoral Deliberation:
On the Occasional Virtues of Fog, 123 HARv. L. REV. 1214, 1241-42 (2010) ("Prima facie
. .. ,the bad man has no foundational claim ofjustice to a more specific price for the
behavior, unless we take ourselves to be running a market and selling off permissions
to misbehave.").
251 ARISTOTLE, POLITcs bk. III, ch. 11, reprinted in 2 COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1986, 2035 (J. Barnes ed., B. Jowett trans., Princeton Univ. Press 1984) (c. 350
B.C.E.).
252 ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. V, ch. 10, reprinted in 2 COMPLETE WORKS
OF ARISTOTLE, supra note 251, at 1729, 1795.
253 See id. at 1796.
254 Kaplow, supra note 248, at 569.
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The ex post approach also helps copyright doctrine to
remain flexible in the face of ever-evolving technologies. Ex post tools
like the fair use standard are important for adapting good responses
to profound changes in technological possibilities. 2 5 6 Although the
fair use doctrine can be criticized for the unpredictability it affords
users,2 57 it at least avoids becoming obsolete very quickly. 258 Similarly,
a response to copyright commandeering that seeks to balance the
potential for socially beneficial transactions with the risk of socially
deleterious ones should preserve some flexibility in order to respond
to real-world developments.
The other notable disadvantage of ex ante rules in the commandeering context is that they permit opportunistic behavior. License
gerrymanders are able to manipulate the words used in their licenses
to achieve dramatically different legal effects. Commandeering, I
have been arguing, is most troubling when it is committed against
those who have not consented. Although our contract system typically
presumes that contracting parties have agreed to be bound by any
terms that are set forth in contracts they have accepted, there are nevertheless reasons for relaxing that assumption in the case of license
gerrymandering. As discussed above, license terms are often ignored
by rational users who decline to invest more effort gaining information about low-value transactions. 25 9 This complacency may stem
from an informed willingness to assume the risk that inheres in agreeing to terms one has not read, especially where that risk seems small
given the low stakes of the transaction. Yet license gerrymandering, if
permitted by courts, can raise the stakes considerably because of the
extent to which copyright remedies outstrip contract remedies. It may
be presumptuous to question the assent of someone who willingly
assumes contractual obligations without reading the contract, but
license gerrymandering imposes new property-level obligations, which
the licensee may have less reason to anticipate. 26 0 The reasonable
user of intellectual property should expect that violation of statutorily
point.

25 5

255 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Contract and Copyright, 42 Hous. L. REv. 953, 965
(2005) ("Ex post, one can identify welfare losses from blocking resale.").
256 See, e.g., Matthew Sag, God in the Machine: A New StructuralAnalysis of Copyright's
FairUse Doctrine, 11 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REv. 381, 384 (2005).
257 See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE 187 (2004) ("[Flair use in America
simply means the right to hire a lawyer to defend your right to create.").
258 Amnon Lehavi, The Dynamic Law of Property: Theorizing the Role of Legal
Standards 32-33 (June 1, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.
com/abstract=1618768.
259 See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
260 But cf Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1148 (7th Cir. 1997) ("Terms
inside Gateway's box stand or fall together. If they constitute the parties' contract
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defined intellectual property rights will be sanctioned rather than
priced at market value. 2 6 1 But it is not so clear that such a person
ought to anticipate the same sanctions being attached to other actions
as well. Much depends on the user's level of legal sophistication.
Existing doctrine already supports this level of fact-intensive scrutiny. As the Bowers case indicates, trial courts have a fair amount of
discretion to limit duplicative damages where infringement coincides
with contract breach.26 2 And although injunctions have historically
been thought suitable forward-looking relief in intellectual property
cases, the Supreme Court has recently instructed courts to weigh four
factors before enjoining future infringement-including (1) irreparable injury, (2) inadequate legal remedies, (3) balance of hardships,
and (4) the public interest-and emphasized that the application of
these factors is a matter for the trial court's equitable discretion. 263
Through conscientious exercise of their equitable powers to
award remedies, courts can correct for opportunistic gerrymandering
in individual cases where it presents a problem. Courts should consider whether the individual defendant had fair notice of the heightened remedies. For instance, the consumer who buys a physical
object at a local retail outlet likely has the understandable belief that
she is the object's owner and is therefore entitled to resell the product
if she changes her mind about the product she has purchased. In
such circumstances, courts should limit breach of the license to contract damages. By contrast, the purchaser of an e-book, like the
programmer who builds on open-source materials, may actually be
aware of the restrictions for such works and so be more appropriately
subject to infringement damages. Of course it will be a factual question what the defendant's expectations were. But courts of equity are
well-suited to learn these facts for the purpose of reaching fair outcomes in particular cases. 264
Courts should also consider reasonable user expectations in cases
where copyright owners attempt to extend property-rule protection
because the Hills had an opportunity to return the computer after reading them,
then all must be enforced.").
261 Cf Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1523 (1984) (distinguishing between remedies that act as sanctions for the sake of punishing and deterring undesirable behavior and those that act as mere prices).
262 See Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317, 1327-28 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
263 See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).
264 Cf Henry E. Smith, An Economic Analysis of Law Versus Equity (May 30,
2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.law.northwestern.edu/col(defending
loquium/law economics/documents/2011_SmithLawVersusEquity.pdf
equity for its circumscribed ability to prevent opportunism in situations where it
would be hard to target by means of generally applicable rules).
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beyond any copyrightable res. A frequently attempted means of leveraging copyright protection is the bundling together of material not
protected by copyright with material that is.265 In the digital world, it
is increasingly easy to make such bundles through the simple addition
of copyrighted code. Such maneuvering now extends beyond computer products to many other consumer goods-from garage door
openers2 66 to printer cartridges. 267 Moreover, the importance of the
Internet in today's economy has produced efforts to enforce website
terms of use through copyright law. Thus in Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., Ticketmaster argued, albeit unsuccessfully, that a competitor committed copyright infringement when it violated website terms
of use by gathering factual information for commercial purposes. 268
It is one thing to allow private parties to invoke contract law to regulate use of material that falls outside copyright's subject matter, but it
is something rather different to subject that material to copyright protection. In such cases, courts can ask whether the accused infringer
was actually concerned with the copyrighted res, or acting on a reasonable assumption that the res that interested him was not under
copyright.
By selectively withholding property remedies, courts can ensure
fair treatment of those who rely on copyright law's defaults and their
own common sense. The earlier discussion of copyright remedies
shows that to defendants, it can matter a great deal whether behavior
constitutes breach of contract or infringement. But the distinction
also has consequences for society as a whole, which courts are also
able to consider in an ex post, remedy-level response to gerrymandering. Because injunctions have the potential to give private parties censorship capabilities, 2 6 9 courts should be suspicious of requests for
injunctive relief in situations where the copyright statute on its own
265 See, e.g., Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. L'anza Research Int'l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135
(1998) (considering first sale's applicability to imported hair care products bearing a
copyrighted label).
266 See Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178 (Fed. Cir.
2004) (rejecting plaintiffs efforts to use the DMCA's anti-circumvention and antitrafficking provisions to shield its software-containing garage door openers from
competition).
267 See Lexmark Int'l v. Static Control Components, 387 F.3d 522, 551 (6th Cir.
2004) (rejecting plaintiffs efforts use the DMCA to shield its printer cartridges from
competition).
268 Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., No. CV997654HLHVBKX, 2003 WL
21406289, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 07, 2003).
269 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Philip J. Weiser, Should Property or Liability Rules
Govern Information?, 85 TEX. L. REv. 783, 792 (2007) (criticizing injunctions that
"put[ ] the dissemination of the defendant's original expression at the mercy of the
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would not have found infringement. Suspicion, however, does not
equal the bright-line rule that the court instituted in MDY Industries.2 70 For there will definitely be socially beneficial conditional
licenses, such as the Creative Commons attribution license, that
indeed create new situations where property-rule remedies apply, but
do so only after providing licensees with very clear and salient notice
of the conditions. In such circumstances, it is hard to identify any
concerns over the new property rules-either from society's perspective or from that of the licensee who knowingly consented to them.
C.

Rights Against the World, Including Third Parties

Legal theorists have long distinguished between in rem rights, like
property rights, and in personam rights, like contract rights. 2 7' The
most common way these Latin terms are defined is according to the
class of correlative duty holders. Whereas contract rights usually
inhere in and apply against only parties to the agreement, property
rights apply much more generally-"against the world." Thus the
class of individuals who hold duties that correspond to an in rem right
is sizeable in number and indefinite in identity, and the class of individuals who hold duties corresponding to an in personamright tend to
be few in number and have an easily ascertained identity.2 72 As
Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith have explained, the boundary
between the two categories is not absolute, for there are situations
that blend aspects of in personam and in rem rights, such as by involving
a large but definite class of duty-holders or a small but indefinite class
of duty-holders.2 73 But the two paradigm cases are reasonably clear.
Commentators have often argued that mass licenses for copyrighted works approach nearer to the in rem paradigm than their contractual provenance would suggest. Copyright owners who condition
access to their products on assent to standardized contract terms seek
to ensure that all users of their works is subject to the terms of the
unilaterally drafted agreement. Widespread distribution pursuant to
standard-form contracts seems to convert in personamrights into in rem
rights by ensuring that every person who interacts with the work is
copyright owner" since "copyright owners may be particularly bad stewards of other
people's takes on their works").
270 See supra notes 229-35 and accompanying text.
271 Two foundational discussions are 1 JOHN AUsTIN, LEcrURES ON JURISPRUDENCE
364-92 (Robert Campbell ed., 5th ed. 1885); HOHFELD, supra note 159, at 65.
272

HOHFELD, supra note 159, at 72.

273

Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101

COLUM. L. REV. 773, 803 (2001).
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bound by the restrictive license. 27 4 These commentators have
expressed concerns about this phenomenon whereby mass licensing
operates as the functional equivalent of property rights-or, as some
have argued, as legislation in its own right 275-and once again suggested preemption of the contracts as a judicial response. Here, however, the argument is based not on a theory of implied preemption or
interference with copyright's perceived balance, but on specific provisions within the Copyright Act. Section 301 expressly preempts state
law that seeks to give rights (1) "equivalent to" any of federal copyright law's exclusive rights and (2) within the subject matter of federal
copyright law. 2 76 In trying to sort out the first requirementequivalency-most circuits generally have employed an "extra element" test 2 77: A right created by state law is equivalent to a right under
federal copyright law if and only if an action that infringes federal
copyright (such as reproduction or distribution of a work) would necessarily also violate the state law right. If violating the state law right
would require something "extra," beyond or in place of the requirements for infringement under federal law, the state law creating that
right is not preempted. This test is not likely to preempt breach of
contract claims, especially for attempts to rearrange copyright law's
initial entitlements as between the contracting parties. For in such
274 See, e.g., Karala, supra note 86, at 540 ("A purported 'contract' on widely distributed products ... essentially binds the world, just like copyright, because no more
is required to establish the expanded rights than the inclusion of a piece of paper
with the product claiming such rights."); Loren, supra note 20, at 511-12 ("[T]hese
contracts do appear to grant rights against the world."); Moffat, supra note 86, at 70
("When they become rights against the world, fair use restrictions conflict with copyright policy."); Maureen A. O'Rourke, Copyright Preemption After the ProCD Case: A
Market-Based Approach, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 53, 80 (1997) ("The rights set up by the
[ProCD] shrinkwrap thus begin to resemble copyright rights against the world rather
than mere contractual rights between two parties.").
275 See, e.g., Merges, supra note 15, at 126; David A. Rice, Public Goods, Private Contract and Public Policy: Federal Preemption of Software License Prohibitions Against Reverse
Engineering,53 U. Prrr. L. REv. 543, 595 (1992).
276 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2006). The full text reads:
On and afterJanuary 1, 1978, all legal or equitable rights that are equivalent
to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by section 106 in works of authorship that are fixed in a tangible
medium of expression and come within the subject matter of copyright as
specified by sections 102 and 103, whether created before or after that date
and whether published or unpublished, are governed exclusively by this title.
Thereafter, no person is entitled to any such right or equivalent right in any
such work under the common law or statutes of any State.
Id.
277 See I NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 132, § 1.01 [B] [1].
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cases, the conduct complained of would not automatically be actionable under copyright law but instead requires that the defendant have
made and then violated some specific contractual promise to the
plaintiff beyond the behavior that copyright law demands.2 78
Some courts, however, have refused to pronounce all state contract claims unpreempted merely on account of their promissory element.2 7 9 In ProCD, the Seventh Circuit vacillated on this important
point. On the one hand, the court thought "it prudent to refrain
from adopting a rule that anything with the label 'contract' is necessarily outside the preemption clause." 280 But on the other hand, the
court seemed to characterize the exclusive rights provided under copyright law as different in kind from rights created by contract, using
the in rem and in personam descriptions as the basis for explaining the
difference: a copyright "restrict[s] the options of persons who are
strangers to the author" and "is a right against the world" whereas
"[ci ontracts, by contrast, generally affect only their parties [such that]
strangers may do as they please."2 8 ' The court's application of the in
rem/ in personam distinction between copyright rights and mass license
rights has provoked much criticism from scholars.
The critics are indeed correct that the ProCD court moved too
quickly to its conclusion. Even though individual agreements are in
personam in character, it is fallacious to infer that the aggregation of
those agreements necessarily exhibits the same in personam quality.28 2
278 See, e.g., Wrench LLC v. Taco Bell Corp., 256 F.3d 446, 457 (6th Cir. 2001)
(classifying a promise to pay for the use of copyrighted content as an extra element
for purposes of preemption analysis); Nat'l Car Rental Sys., Inc. v. Computer Assocs.
Int'l, Inc., 991 F.2d 426, 430-33 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that breach of a contractual
restriction prohibiting use of licensed software to process data for third parties contained an extra element that would not have been prohibited under copyright law);
Taquino v. Teledyne Monarch Rubber, 893 F.2d 1488, 1501 (5th Cir. 1990) ("This
action for breach of contract involves an element in addition to mere reproduction,
distribution or display: the contract promise made by Taquino, therefore, it is not
preempted.").
279 E.g., Wrench, 256 F.3d at 457 ("[W]e do not embrace the proposition that all
state law contract claims survive preemption simply because they involve the additional element of promise.").
280 ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1455 (7th Cir. 1996).
281 Id. at 1454; see also id. at 1455 ("[Wlhether a particular license is generous or
restrictive, a simple two-party contract is not 'equivalent to any of the exclusive rights
within the general scope of copyright' and therefore may be enforced." (quoting 17
U.S.C. § 301(a))).
282 Hohfeld, for example, is often accused of defining in rem rights as nothing
more than the large-scale aggregation of in personam rights. See, e.g., J.E. PENNER, THE
IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAw 23 (1997); Merrill & Smith, supra note 273, at 786; see also
HOHFELD, supra note 159, at 72, 91 (describing in rem rights). As Merrill and Smith
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This inference commits the fallacy of composition by wrongly deducing from the premise that all the parts of something possesses a particular property the conclusion that the whole something possesses that
property.2 8 3 It is mistaken to infer that a house is small simply because
each of its rooms is small, or, as Condorcet showed, that a group's
voting preferences are transitive simply because the voting preferences of each of its members are transitive.2 8 4 So it may be wrong to
infer that the result of mass licensing business practice is in personam
because it creates many individual in personam contracts. Yet although
inferences exhibiting the compositional form are deductively invalid-that is, their conclusion does not follow from the premisessome such inferences are nevertheless reasonable. For example, it
might not be true that a team is good just because all of its players are
good, but nevertheless the fact is usually good evidence that the team
is good.28 5 It is also safe to conclude that a chair is brown from the
fact that its parts are all brown. 2 8 6 Thus the merits of inferences about
aggregates depend heavily on specific circumstances, and it is clearly
wrong to assume that the aggregate features a different character than
its parts with respect to any particular quality. So it is with the ProCD
court's conclusion. Further analysis is needed to determine whether
there is a transformation from in personam to in rem rights in the context of standardized contracts.
The most common way of making the in rem argument more concrete is to target licenses that strive to regulate all access to the
explain in detail, however, reducing in rem rights to mere aggregates obscures the fact
that in rem rights function differently than in personam rights by economizing on information costs in certain circumstances. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 273, at
799-803.
283 There are various ways to refine this definition, but such subtleties are not
important to my point here. See, e.g., William L. Rowe, The Fallacy of Composition, 71
MIND 87 (1962); see also Yehoshua Bar-Hillel, More on the Fallacy of Composition, 73
MIND 125, 125 (1964) (arguing against Rowe that the fallacy of composition can be
characterized simply using Carnapian meaning postulates); James E. Broyles, The Fallacies of Composition and Division, 8 PHIL. & RHETORIC 108, 108 (1975) (defending
Rowe's view that it is difficult to produce a satisfying general characterization of the
fallacy of composition).
284 See Marquis de Condorcet, Essay on the Application of Mathematics to the Theory of
Decision-Making, in CONDORCET 33, 52-57 (Keith Michael Baker ed. & trans., BobbsMerrill Co., 1976) (1785). For further discussion of Condorcet's Paradox in this context and an argument that fallacies of composition (and related phenomena) are
common in public law theory, see Adrian Vermeule, Foreword: System Effects and the
Constitution, 123 HARv. L. REv. 4 (2009).
285 See Broyles, supra note 283, at 110.
286 Rowe, supra note 283, at 87-88.
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licensed work. 2 8 7 A licensor really does seem to have a right against
the world once he has contracted with everyone in it. Yet like the
arguments considered in Part II, this argument is less powerful than
its proponents indicate. The first limitation, surfacing in ProCDitself,
is on its applicability. Recall that the ProCDcourt upheld a restriction
on the use of telephone directory listings, admittedly uncopyrightable
material.2 8 After stating that someone who found a copy of ProCD's
product on the street would be a stranger to the shrinkwrap contract
and hence not bound by the same use-restricting terms as
Zeidenberg, 28 9 the court went on to emphasize that the shrinkwrap
would not prevent anyone who chose not to buy ProCD's product
from copying or distributing the same telephone directory content
that ProCD had collected. 29 0 That material itself remained in the
public domain as much as ever. In this respect, the case echoes the
famous misappropriation case, InternationalNews Service v. Associated
Press, which held that the AP's competitor could not free ride on its
news reporting efforts even though the misappropriated content was
not copyrighted by AP. 2 9 1 The Supreme Court emphasized that the
AP had no property interest in its news as againstthe public, but never287 See, e.g., Elkin-Koren, supra note 135, at 1163 ("Terms in such contracts are not
tailored to any specific transaction or any particular party. They are standardized and
universal. They uniformly govern all access to a work."); Loren, supra note 20, at
511-12 ("[F]or clickwrap agreements the only way for anyone to have access to the
work is to agree to these provisions."); Moffat, supra note 86, at 69-70 ("It is extremely
difficult to locate this kind of agreement in the neoclassical model of private ordering, as there is no one who is a 'stranger to the contract."' (quoting ProCD, Inc. v.
Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1454 (7th Cir. 1996)); cf Kajala, supra note 86, at 540-41
(arguing that wide distribution and absence of negotiation are the important facts).
Robert Merges pursues another strategy, reserving his label, "private legislation,"
for contracting that (1) is ubiquitous, (2) trades on the licensor's market power, and
(3) is evidently objectionable to licensees. Merges, supra note 15, at 126. His careful
definition of "private legislation," however, has not proved as popular as the label
itself, which is bandied about widely without insistence on his definitional restrictions.
See, e.g., Moffat, supra note 86, at 69; Nimmer et al., supra note 80, at 61; cf Cohen,
supra note 83, at 479 n.61, 485 n.79 (criticizing the restrictiveness of Merges's definition). But cf Maureen A. O'Rourke, Drawing the Boundary Between Copyright and Contract: Copyright Preemption of Software License Terms, 45 DuKE L.J. 479, 557 (1995)
(arguing that mass licenses "should not be preempted unless, by creating and enforcing 'private copyright,' the licensor gains near monopoly power in the market for the
particular information").
288 At any rate, the court was willing to assume that the material was uncopyrightable. Rather mysteriously, it seemed to hint that, if pressed, it could distinguish Feist.
See ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1449.
289 Id. at 1454.
290 Id. at 1455.
291 Int'l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 234-36 (1918).
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theless did have a "quasi property" interest in the news as against its
competitor, which prohibited only the competitor's unauthorized copying.2 92 Because there remained individuals who were not bound by
the rights ProCD claimed in the telephone directory information,
ProCD's restrictive terms created an in personam right that exceeded
the copyright statute's exclusive rights, as did the in personam right
that the INS v. AP Court articulated.2 9 3
Although the court in ProCDpainted with too broad a brush, the
particular conclusion it reached-about the in personam character of
ProCD's licensing-was correct because the license only imposed a
duty not to copy the directory on specific individuals who were in privity with ProCD. 29 4 Thus the claim that ProCD had an against-theworld right in the telephone directory is false, and so criticisms
depending on that claim fail at least against ProCDin particular. More
generally, it is not at all clear that "[t]here are many situations in
which the expressive material is available only pursuant to contract
terms that limit fair use."29 5 Although copyright law certainly does
guarantee copyright owners some degree of insulation from competition, for any given copyrighted work there is an open question about
the extent to which suitable substitutes are available.2 96 Consider
computer software, which as we have seen is often sold subject to
restrictive licenses: a prospective purchaser of Microsoft Windows who
292 Id. at 236.
293 See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, "Hot News": The Enduring Myth of Property in News,
111 COLUM. L. REv. 419, 435 (2011) (observing that the Court did not give the AP an
in rem entitlement); see also Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property as Property: Delineating
Entitlements in Information, 116 YALE L.J. 1742, 1754 (2007) (distinguishing narrow and
broad readings of INS v. AP).
294 The ProCD story is slightly more complicated than this, but only slightly.
Although the court of appeals did not mention it, ProCD had actually sued
Zeidenberg for copyright infringement as well as for breach of contract and assorted
other claims. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 908 F. Supp. 640, 643-44 (W.D. Wis. 1996).
The basis for the copyright claim was its copyrightable software program, which was
the vessel for transmitting the uncopyrighted telephone directory data that actually
interested Zeidenberg. Thus the case actually involved two res-the telephone directory and the computer program-but the res with actual commercial value, the directory, was still available for others to copy and commercialize on their own initiative.
The fact that the two res were bundled together to make copyright remedies available
is at most reason for courts not to award copyright remedies according to the argument I advanced in the last section. It is irrelevant to the present point that the res of
interest was not subject to any genuine in rem right of ProCD's making.
295 Moffat, supra note 86, at 69.
296 Cf Radin, supra note 84, at 185 (noting that the argument that contract can
become property "involves what is happening in practice ... [and] cannot be resolved
without some characterization of what is happening on the ground").
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wishes to reverse engineer or who simply opposes commandeering on
principle can opt to use Linux instead. While there is no point pretending that market forces guard against all abuses, the laws of supply
and demand are not completely inapplicable, either. If enough users
find restrictions objectionable, competitors will have an incentive to
distribute works without those restrictions. As the earlier discussion of
price discrimination suggested, right-holders themselves may attempt
to cater to users with such demands. At least in the current market, it
is common to find many works available for sale in multiple formats.
So those consumers who like having the ability to resell items from
their personal media libraries can opt to buy hard copies rather than
shop in the Kindle or iTunes stores.
There is, however, one kind of commandeering against which the
"rights against the world" argument works quite well. Once a copyright owner has first sold a copy of its work, the first sale doctrine
permits the purchaser of that copy to resell it at no risk of committing
infringement. But the doctrine does not apply to copies that have
never been sold by the copyright owner. Even third parties-despite
their absence of privity with the right-holder-can be liable for
infringement if they acquire and then resell copies of copyrighted
works that were never subject to an initial sale-even if they had no
reason to know that previous transactions upstream of them never
included a sale.29 7 Using contracts to characterize commercial transactions in copies of copyrighted works as mere licenses and not sales,
some copyright owners have attempted to impose liability where there
is no privity. These contracts really do have the ability to create rights
against the world by imposing new duties on non-consenting third
parties. In this respect, these contracts are quite unlike those that, as
in ProCD, bind only users who have had notice of their terms and
done some action that signals consent.29 8
297 See, e.g., Am. Int'l Pictures, Inc. v. Foreman, 576 F.2d 661, 664 (5th Cir. 1978)
("[E]ven an unwitting purchaser who buys a copy in the secondary market can be
held liable for infringement if the copy was not the subject of a first sale by the copyright holder.").
298 In their ability to bind unconsenting third parties, these end-runs around first
sale also differ from restrictive licenses with which they have been categorized by
other scholars as "the new servitudes." See Van Houweling, supra note 18, at 889; see
also, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin & R. Polk Wagner, The Myth of Private Ordering: Rediscovering Legal Realism in Cyberspace, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1295, 1312-13 (1998) (dis-

cussing contracts that "run with" computer software); Robinson, supra note 109, at
1478 (discussing the blurring of lines between in rem and in personam aspects of computer software). The servitudes metaphor has its force because downstream consumers are subject to the same obligations as their predecessors in interest despite
minimal interaction with the right-holder. Yet although one can use servitudes as a
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In Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc.,'29 9 for example, the manufacturer of a
computer program had transferred copies of its software to a company that was contractually prohibited from transferring the software
to anyone else.30 0 Timothy Vernor eventually bought the company's
copies and tried to resell them on eBay, whereupon Autodesk complained that Vernor was infringing its copyright.s0 Autodesk argued
that the first sale doctrine did not permit Vernor's distribution
because it had never sold the software but rather had only licensed
the initial transferee to use it. Despite the fact that the initial transferee was not contractually obligated ever to return its copies of the
Autodesk software, the court agreed with Autodesk and held that the
license's terms, read as a whole, revealed this initial transaction
upstream of Vernor not to be a sale.30 2 Thus the terms of the
upstream license arrangement precluded application of the first sale
doctrine and subjected Vernor to liability for infringing Autodesk's
exclusive right to distribute copies of its software.
The Vernor court insisted that its decision followed from Ninth
Circuit precedent,3 0 3 but even assuming that insistence is justified, little else can be said on the decision's behalf. In analyzing the
upstream transaction, the court focused entirely on the terms of the
written license agreement, which were unilaterally drafted by the copyright owner.3 0 4 This approach makes nonsense out of the sequence
launching pad for interesting policy discussion, see Van Houweling, supra note 18, at
932-49, many of the so-called new servitudes are formally distinguishable from the
more interesting varieties of their ancestors insofar as they do involve individual
"click-wrap" agreements between the upstream party and each downstream user. By
contrast, where an old-fashioned servitude's benefit or burden runs with the property,
the servitude is enforceable even between individuals who have never contracted
together or had any previous interaction. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES ch. 1, introductory n. (2000) (providing an overview of real property

interests that run with the land).
299 621 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2010).
300 See id. at 1104.
301 Id. at 1105-06.
302 Id. at 1111-13. Since Vernor, the Ninth Circuit reached a very similar result
interpreting the software license in MDY Industries, LLC v. Blizzard Entertainment, Inc.,
629 F.3d 928, 938-39 (9th Cir. 2010).
303 See Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1108-11 (citing Wall Data, Inc. v. L.A. Cnty. Sheriff's
Dep't, 447 F.3d 769 (9th Cir. 2006); Triad Sys. Corp. v. Se. Express Co., 64 F.3d 1330
(9th Cir. 1995); MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993);
and United States v. Wise, 550 F.2d 1180 (9th Cir. 1977)).
304 See Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1111 ("We hold today that a software user is a licensee
rather than an owner of a copy where the copyright owner (1) specifies that the user
is granted a license; (2) significantly restricts the user's ability to transfer the software;
and (3) imposes notable use restrictions.").
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of events that occurs in usual software transactions. As the court
observed, end-user license restrictions typically appear when the user
installs the software.3 05 Before that point in time, something looking
like a commercial transaction has already concluded: the would-be
user has handed over money in exchange for a tangible product that
he will now go elsewhere to install. One may even pay for some tangible software product and then decide not to install it. What sort of
transactions are these? By the court's reasoning, they would have to
be licenses and not sales, since the transferee would not be authorized, under the first sale doctrine, to go sell his new acquisition. Yet
what makes it the case that the first sale doctrine does not apply, on
the Ninth Circuit's view, are the terms of a license that has not yet
been accepted by any licensee. It is not clear why license terms should
be binding in the absence of assent to them.3 0 6 Because such licenses
thus attempt to generate rights against the world-that is, against
third parties who are not bound by them as a matter of contract lawcourts should hold either that a triggering sale has occurred when the
transferee acquired indefinite possession of the product,30 7 or that
enforcement of the terms is preempted to the extent that it imposes
liability on third parties in the absence of any binding contractual
promise to act as an extra element.3 0
Aside from the express preemption provisions in the copyright
statute, one can object to third parties' liability to licensors on
grounds of both fairness and welfare, at least where those third parties
have inadequate notice of the new rights. 30 9 It can be unfair to sub305 See id. at 1104.
306 Remarkably enough, Autodesk had evidently also claimed-beyond copyright
infringement and regardless of the first sale doctrine's applicability-that Vernor was
bound by the license agreement that applied to the upstream software customer. Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 555 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1175-76 (W.D. Wash. 2008), rev'd, 621
F.3d 1002. Thus Autodesk seemed to be arguing that the Vernor was liable for breach
of contract, despite the absence of any evidence that he had ever assented to
Autodesk's license. The district court rightly rejected this argument, id. at 1176,
which the court of appeals did not reach.
307 Cf Krause v. Titleserv, Inc., 402 F.3d 119, 123 (2d Cir. 2005) ("[I]t seems
anomalous for a user whose degree of ownership of a copy is so complete that he may
lawfully use it and keep it forever, or if so disposed, throw it in the trash, to be nonetheless unauthorized to fix it when it develops a bug, or to make an archival copy as
backup security [pursuant to the essential step defense, 17 U.S.C. § 117(a) (2006)].").
308 See supra notes 276-78.
309 The fairness and welfare considerations probably do weaken at least to some
extent where the burdened third party has actual notice of the restriction, but that
does not mean that courts should merely refuse to enforce first sale restrictions on
parties who lack notice. To carve out an exception by enforcing such restrictions
against parties with notice would be a substantial repudiation of the line drawn in
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ject someone to sanctions if they had no reason to know they were
engaging in sanctioned behavior, and the risk of such sanctions being
imposed despite lack of notice creates third-party information costs
that are not internalized by the contracting parties.3 10 Promotional
CDs, to take a low-priced yet litigated example, are frequently distributed with putative first sale restrictions.3 11 But because these restrictions occur in the form of labels and not via digital terms of service
that every downstream user must click through, such notice may not
be preserved down the chain of distribution. If such labels are
enforced as rendering the first sale doctrine unavailable, the cautious
person wishing to avoid infringement, who acquires a second-hand
CD and wishes to resell it, may expend effort verifying that it is encumbered by no such restriction. This verification could be costly since
the original terms will likely be difficult to locate.3 1 2 To be sure, distribution of promotional CDs can benefit society by giving those whose
views matter in the music world a cheap and easy opportunity to
review new releases.3 13 But there is no warrant for assuming that such
benefits, minus the costs imposed on all individuals who transact in
CDs and take precautions against infringement, outweigh the cost/
Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 350-51 (1908), which was between parties in
privity with the copyright owner (against whom restrictions were enforceable) and
parties not in privity with the copyright owner but on notice (against whom restrictions were ineffectual).
310 See Smith, supra note 114, at 2124.
311 See, e.g., UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Augusto, 628 F.3d 1175 (9th Cir. 2011)
(holding that mailing promotional CDs triggered first sale doctrine).
312 Similar problems arise from the Ninth Circuit's decision in Omega S.A. v. Costco
Wholesale Corp., 541 F.3d 982 (9th Cir. 2008), affd mem., per curiam by an equally divided
court, 131 S. Ct. 565 (2010), which held that the first sale doctrine does not apply to
copies of works if the copies are created outside the United States and never sold in
the United States pursuant to the copyright owner's authorization. Id. at 985-86; see
alsoJohn Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Kirtsaeng, 654 F.3d 210, 222 & n.44 (2d Cir. 2011)
(holding that first sale doctrine does not apply to foreign-manufactured copies of
copyrighted works). For brisk but perceptive remarks on information cost consequences of Omega's holding, see Eric Felten, Watch Outfor the Omega Copyright Windup,
WALL ST. J., July 30, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527487039770
04575393160596764410.html ("Constrain the first-sale doctrine and you throw a
wrench into the business of used-book stores, garage sales (including the electronic
garage sale that is eBay), and any and every sort of secondhand shop. And yes, even
public libraries might find themselves facing the challenge of figuring out which
books on the stacks were first sold in the U.S., and which were first sold abroad.").
313 See Richard A. Epstein, The Disintegration of Intellectual Property?A ClassicalLiberal Response to a PrematureObituary,62 STAN. L. REv. 455, 506 (2010) ("[T]he object of
the original [promotional CD distribution] was to allow influential opinion leaders to
hear the record in order to promote its sale more widely, which works to the benefit
of both the copyright holders and potential purchasers of the CD.").
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benefit package that would be realized if the law did not enforce the
restriction.3 14
As I noted above, the first sale doctrine has long resulted in this
sort of burden on third parties-to an extent-since it has long been
the law that third parties who in good faith sell copies of works never
subject to a first sale can still be held liable for infringement.3 1 5 Yet as
compared with previous applications of this doctrine, commandeering compounds the problem in a way that is it harder to justify.
Whereas prior cases upheld distribution-infringement claims against
the resellers of pirated goods,3 16 manufacturers of the copyright
owner's products attempting to sell the goods without authorization,3 17 and resellers of goods acquired by questionable means,3 18
commandeering involves restrictions placed on goods that the copyright owner has affirmatively relinquished to consumers indefinitely.
Not only do these actions occur on a massive scale and therefore
affect a much larger group of potential third-party duty-holders, but
they are furthermore the product of the copyright owner's own voluntary choices. These choices ensure that the copyright owner receives
at least a large part of the benefit that the exclusive distribution right
(as qualified by the first sale doctrine) is created to secure.3 19 In such
cases, therefore, there is no good reason for the law to tolerate the
burdens that commandeering places on unconsenting third parties,
and so courts should rebuff attempts to bind them.
CONCLUSION

To close his magisterial history of copyright law, Lyman Ray Patterson urged courts to stop feeling obliged to address difficult, everevolving copyright controversies wholly within the strictures of statu314 For example, the benefits to copyright owners of distributing hard copies of
their CDs may exceed the costs to them of a small secondary market. Or they might
find alternative means to distribute their works, such as digital distribution coupled
with rights-management technological measures.
315 E.g., Am. Int'l Pictures, Inc. v. Foreman, 576 F.2d 661, 664 (5th Cir. 1978).
316 See Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Goody, 248 F.2d 260, 264 (2d Cir. 1957).
317 See Platt & Munk Co. v. Republic Graphics, Inc., 315 F.2d 847, 854 (2d Cir.
1963).
318 See Am. Int'l Pictures, 576 F.2d at 664 ("[Defendant] stated in a deposition that
he knew better than to ask where his sources acquired their films.").
319 See Platt & Munk Co., 315 F.2d at 854 ("[T]he ultimate question embodied in
the 'first sale' doctrine [is] 'whether or not there has been such a disposition of the
article that it may fairly be said that the patentee [or copyright proprietor] has
received his reward for the use of the article'" (quoting United States v. Masonite
Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 278 (1942))).
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tory interpretation: "Copyright statutes have provided rules, not principles, and if the principles necessary to a sound body of copyright law
are to be formulated, the judges must accomplish the task."3 20
Today, U.S. copyright law remains the awkward product of an
aging statute and disputes between self-interested parties. Courts
faced with resolving those disputes often find themselves confronting
the same sorts of issues that arise throughout the private law, and yet
they do not operate with the same sort of doctrine-making authority
that has traditionally defined common law adjudication. Although
historically judges have been responsible for the creation of numerous
copyright doctrines-from fair use to first sale to misuse 3 2 1-more
recently, in our "age of statutes," 322 courts are not always eager to
introduce new principles into federal intellectual property law.323
This Article has made the case that courts can and should take a
principled approach to the controversies generated by large-scale
attempts to alter the entitlements distributed by copyright law. As I
showed in Part I, commandeering encompasses a wide range of behavior. The challenge of finding a consistent approach to commandeering-related controversies is therefore considerable. In Part II, I
addressed three previous approaches toward commandeering and
argued that they take reasonable concerns to untenable extremes.
Finally, in Part III, I proposed a new approach, which operates on the
principle that courts should not countenance attempts to change the
way that copyright entitlements function as property rights for individuals who did not consent to the changes.
This principle strikes me as the most convincing way to account
for (1) the intuition that there must be some limits on commandeering, (2) the copyright statute's general unhelpfulness for ascertaining those limits, and (3) the legal system's deeply rooted respect
for contractual freedom. As I have indicated, this principle also has a
foothold in already available doctrines, especially remedial equity, and
320 LYMAN RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 229 (1968).
321 See, e.g., Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942) (involving
patent misuse); Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 350 (1908) (involving first
sale doctrine); Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901) (involving fair use). See generally Aaron Perzanowski & Jason Schultz, DigitalExhaustion, 58
UCLA L. REv. 889, 926-30 (2011) (discussing the common law roots of copyright
doctrines).
322 See GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982).
323 But cf Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., No. 10-6, slip op. at 10-12
(2011) (incorporating criminal law doctrine of willful blindness into law of induced
patent infringement).
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the copyright statute's express preemption provision. It thus has the
potential to make at least a modest move toward a sounder body of
copyright law within the rules set forth by the copyright statute.

